Torts

1
Torts

• A tort is a civil wrong. The tort system of
  liability is central to the American legal
  system.

2
Negligence

• The concept of negligence is central to the tort
  system of liability. The negligence concept is
  centered on the principle that every individual
  should exercise a minimum degree of ordinary care
  so as not to cause harm to others.

3
Who Is Responsible

• Everyone is responsible, not only for the result
  of his or her willful acts, but also for an
  injury occasioned to another by his or her want
  of ordinary care or skill in the management of
  his or her property or person. (Cal.Civ.Code
  1714(a).) "Negligence is not the act itself, but
  the fact which defines the character of the act,
  and makes it a legal wrong." (Stephenson v.
  Southern Pac. Co. (1894) 102 Cal. 143, 147.)

4
NEGLIGENCE AND ORDINARY CARE-DEFINITIONS

• Negligence is the doing of something which a
  reasonably prudent person would not do, or the
  failure to do something which a reasonably
  prudent person would do, under the same or
  similar circumstances. It is the failure to use
  ordinary or reasonable care. Ordinary or
  reasonable care is that care which persons of
  ordinary prudence would use.

5
NEGLIGENCE-ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

• The elements of a cause of action in tort for
  negligence are (1) a duty to use ordinary care
  (2) breach of that duty (3) a proximate causal
  connection between the negligent conduct and the
  resulting injury and (4) resulting damage. (Budd
  v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200.)

6
In other words, the essential elements of a claim
of negligence are

• 1. The defendant was negligent
• 2. Defendant's negligence was a cause of injury,
  damage, loss or harm to plaintiff.

7
A TEST FOR DETERMINING THE QUESTION OF NEGLIGENCE

• One test that is helpful in determining whether
  or not a person was negligent is to ask and
  answer the question whether or not, if a person
  of ordinary prudence had been in the same
  situation and possessed of the same knowledge, he
  or she would have foreseen or anticipated that
  someone might have been injured by or as a result
  of his or her action or inaction. If the answer
  to that question is "yes", and if the action or
  inaction reasonably could have been avoided, then
  not to avoid it would be negligence.

8
AMOUNT OF CAUTION VARIES

• The amount of caution required of a person in the
  exercise of ordinary care depends upon the
  conditions that are apparent or that should be
  apparent to a reasonably prudent person under the
  same or similar circumstances.

9
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS' GOOD CONDUCT

• Every person who is exercising ordinary care, has
  a right to assume that every other person will
  perform his her duty and obey the law, and in the
  absence of reasonable cause for thinking
  otherwise, it is not negligence for such a person
  to fail to anticipate an accident which can occur
  only as a result of a violation of law or duty by
  another person.

10
RIGHT TO ASSUME OTHERS' NORMAL FACULTIES

• A person who is exercising ordinary care has a
  right to assume that other persons are ordinarily
  intelligent and possessed of normal sight and
  hearing, in the absence of reasonable cause for
  thinking otherwise.

11
DUTY TO ANTICIPATE CRIMINAL CONDUCT OF THIRD
PERSON

• When the circumstances are such that the
  possibility of harm caused by the criminal
  conduct of a third person is, or in the exercise
  of due care should be, reasonably foreseeable, it
  is negligence to fail to use reasonable care to
  prevent such criminal act from causing injury or
  damage.

12
EVIDENCE OF CUSTOM IN RELATION TO ORDINARY CARE

• Evidence as to whether a person conformed or did
  not conform to a custom that had grown up in a
  given locality or business is relevant and ought
  to be considered, but is not necessarily
  controlling on the issue whether such person was
  negligent.

13
STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR MINOR

• A minor is not held to the same standard of care
  as an adult. A minor is required to exercise the
  degree of care which ordinarily is exercised by
  minors of like maturity, intelligence and
  capacity under similar circumstances.
• Minor - n. someone under legal age, which is
  generally 18, except for certain purposes such as
  drinking alcoholic beverages.

14
IMPAIRED PHYSICAL FACULTIES-AMOUNT OF CAUTION

• The amount of caution required of a person whose
  physical faculties are impaired is the care which
  a person of ordinary prudence with similarly
  impaired faculties would use under the same or
  similar circumstances.

15
CARE REQUIRED FOR SAFETY OF MINOR

• Ordinarily it is necessary to exercise greater
  caution for the protection and safety of a young
  child than for an adult person who possesses
  normal physical and mental faculties. One dealing
  with children must anticipate their ordinary
  behavior. The fact that children usually do not
  exercise the same degree of prudence for their
  own safety as adults, or that they often are
  thoughtless and impulsive, imposes a duty to
  exercise a proportional vigilance and caution on
  those dealing with children, and from whose
  conduct injury to a child might result.

16
NEGLIGENCE PER SE--VIOLATION OF STATUTE,
ORDINANCE, OR SAFETY ORDER

• The violation of a law or statute that results in
  injury to another may constitute negligence per
  se. However, just because a statute has been
  violated does not mean that the violator is
  necessarily liable for any damage that might be
  ultimately traced back to the violation. "The
  doctrine of negligence per se does not apply even
  though a statute has been violated if the
  plaintiff was not in the class of persons
  designed to be protected or the type of harm
  which occurred was not one which the statute was
  designed to prevent." (Olsen v. McGillicuddy
  (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 897, 902-903) Mere "but for"
  causation, is simply not enough. The statute must
  be designed to protect against the kind of harm
  which occurred.

17
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--DEFINITION

• Is negligence on the part of a plaintiff which,
  combining with the negligence of a defendant,
  contributes as a cause in bringing about the
  injury. "Contributory negligence is conduct on
  the part of the plaintiff which falls below the
  standard to which he should conform for his own
  protection, and which is a legally contributing
  cause cooperating with the negligence of the
  defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's
  harm." (Rest. 2d Torts, 463.)

18
Contributory Negligence

• Traditionally, any amount of contributory
  negligence on the part of a plaintiff, no matter
  how small, operated as a total bar to recovery.
  However, the modern rule of comparative
  negligence has softened the harsh effect of the
  traditional rule.

19

• The majority of states have now abrogated the
  "all-or-nothing" rule of contributory negligence
  and have enacted in its place general
  apportionment statutes calculated in one manner
  or another to assess liability in proportion to
  fault. Hence, in most jurisdictions, contributory
  negligence is no longer a total bar to
  plaintiff's recovery.

20

• Contributory negligence, if any, on the part of
  the plaintiff does not bar a recovery by the
  plaintiff against the defendant but the total
  amount of damages to which the plaintiff would
  otherwise be entitled shall be reduced in
  proportion to the amount of negligence
  attributable to the plaintiff. (Li v. Yellow Cab
  (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804) In California, the doctrine
  of last clear chance is abolished, and the
  defense of assumption of risk is also abolished
  to the extent that it is merely a variant of the
  former doctrine of contributory negligence.

21
Federal Sphere

• In the federal sphere, comparative negligence of
  the "pure" type has been the rule since 1908 in
  cases arising under the Federal Employers'
  Liability Act (see 45 U.S.C. 53) and since 1920
  in cases arising under the Jones Act (see 46
  U.S.C. 688) and the Death on the High Seas Act
  (see 46 U.S.C. 766).

22
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--FORGETFULNESS OF KNOWN
DANGER

• If a plaintiff voluntarily proceeds into a
  dangerous situation of which he or she had
  previous knowledge, but momentarily forgot the
  danger, such forgetfulness is not in itself
  contributory negligence unless under all the
  circumstances it shows an absence of ordinary
  care not to have kept the danger in mind.

23
RECOVERY FOR INTENTIONAL HARM NOT DIMINISHED BY
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

• Contributory negligence, if any, on the part of
  the plaintiff does not reduce any recovery by the
  plaintiff against the defendant for an injury
  caused by misconduct of the defendant, if the
  defendant intended to inflict harm upon the
  plaintiff.

24
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE--MINORS

• In California, a minor under the age of five
  years is incapable of contributory negligence as
  a matter of law. Contributory negligence, if any,
  on the part of the minor over the age of five
  years does not bar a recovery against the
  defendant but the total amount of damages to
  which the minor would otherwise be entitled is
  reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence
  attributable to the minor. The negligence, if
  any, of the parents, or either of them, does not
  bar or reduce recovery of damages for injuries to
  the minor.

25
DUTY OF PASSENGER FOR OWN SAFETY

• One who is simply a passenger in a motor vehicle
  and has no right to the control or management of
  such vehicle nevertheless has the duty to
  exercise the same ordinary care for his or her
  own safety and protection as a person of ordinary
  prudence would take under the same or similar
  circumstances. The passenger has the duty of
  doing whatever a person of ordinary prudence in
  the same situation would do to inform or warn the
  driver in an effort to prevent an accident.

26
DUTY OF PASSENGER FOR OWN SAFETY

• Contributory negligence, if any, by the passenger
  does not bar recovery against the defendant but
  the total amount of damages to which the
  passenger would otherwise be entitled shall be
  reduced in proportion to the amount of negligence
  attributable to the passenger.

27
RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR
APPLICATION

• Res ipsa loquitur is the name of a doctrine that
  permits a trier of fact to infer the existence of
  negligence in the absence of direct evidence of
  negligence. For the doctrine to apply it must be
  shown that

28
RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR
APPLICATION (Continued)

• First, that it is the kind of accident or injury
  which ordinarily does not happen unless someone
  is negligent
• Second, that it was caused by an agency or
  instrumentality in the exclusive control of the
  defendant over which the defendant had the
  exclusive right of control originally, and which
  was not mishandled or its condition otherwise
  changed after defendant relinquished control and

29
RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR
APPLICATION (Continued)

• Third, that the accident or injury was not due to
  any voluntary action or contribution on the part
  of the plaintiff which was the responsible cause
  of plaintiff's injury.

30
RES IPSA LOQUITUR -- PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

• If the foregoing circumstances are established,
  the trier of fact must find from the happening of
  the accident or incident involved that a cause of
  the occurrence was some negligent conduct on the
  part of the defendant.

31
Negligence - Duty

• Duty concerns whether a person has a legal
  obligation to act, and a corresponding legal
  liability for failing to act, in a particular
  circumstance. The existence of a duty is a
  question of law for the court. (Isaacs v.
  Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985) 38 Cal.3d
  112, 124.)

32
RISK IMPORTS RELATION

• The seminal case on duty is (Palsgraf v. Long
  Island R. Co. (1928) 248 N.Y. 339 162 N.E. 99,
  59 A.L.R. 1253) While Mrs. Palsgraf stood on a
  platform of defendant's railroad, a man carrying
  a package of fireworks wrapped in a newspaper
  attempted to board a moving train. A railroad
  employee assisted him, and the package was
  dislodged, fell and exploded. The shock threw
  down platform scales many feet away, and these
  struck Mrs. Palsgraf. Palsgraf established that
  in analyzing questions regarding the scope of an
  individual actor's duty, the courts look to
  whether the relationship of the parties is such
  as to give rise to a duty of care and whether the
  plaintiff was within the zone of foreseeable
  harm. (Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., supra.)

33
Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.

• "The damaged plaintiff must be able to point the
  finger of responsibility at a defendant owing,
  not a general duty to society, but a specific
  duty to him." (Johnson v. Jamaica Hosp., , 62
  NY2d 523, 527.) "The risk reasonably to be
  perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."
  (Palsgraf v. Long Is. R.R. Co., supra.). In other
  words, foresee ability of risk defines the scope
  of duty.

34
THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE VARIES WITH THE
FORESEEABILITY OF THE POSSIBLE HARM.

• The kind and number of hazards encompassed within
  a particular duty depend on the nature of the
  duty. Where an individual breaches a legal duty
  and thereby causes an occurrence that is within
  the class of foreseeable hazards that the duty
  exists to prevent, the individual may be held
  liable, even though the harm may have been
  brought about in an unexpected way. Conduct is
  considered negligent when it tends to subject
  another to an unreasonable risk of harm arising
  from one or more particular foreseeable hazards
  (Rest.2d Torts 281).

35
THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE VARIES WITH THE
FORESEEABILITY OF THE POSSIBLE HARM (CONTINUED)

• When the person is harmed by an occurrence
  resulting from one of those hazards, the
  negligent actor may be held liable. In contrast,
  where the harm was caused by an occurrence that
  was not part of the risk or recognized hazard
  involved in the actor's conduct, the actor is not
  liable. For example A gives a loaded pistol to
  B, a boy of eight, to carry to C. In handing the
  pistol to C, the boy drops it, injuring the bare
  foot of D, his comrade. The fall discharges the
  pistol wounding C. A is subject to liability to
  C, but not to D. (Rest.2d Torts 281 comment f)

36
THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE VARIES WITH THE
FORESEEABILITY OF THE POSSIBLE HARM (CONTINUED)

• Under the common law, as a general rule, one
  person owed no duty to control the conduct of
  another Rest.2d Torts (1965) 315), nor to warn
  those endangered by such conduct (Rest.2d Torts,
  supra, 314, com. c. Prosser, Law of Torts (4th
  ed. 1971) 56, p. 341) The courts have carved
  out an exception to this rule in cases in which
  the defendant stands in some special relationship
  to either the person whose conduct needs to be
  controlled or in a relationship to the
  foreseeable victim of that conduct (see Rest.2d
  Torts, supra, 315-320).

37
THE SCOPE OF ANY DUTY OF CARE VARIES WITH THE
FORESEEABILITY OF THE POSSIBLE HARM (CONTINUED)

• As explained in section 315 of the Restatement
  Second of Torts, "a duty of care may arise from
  either (a) a special relation ... between the
  actor and the third person which imposes a duty
  upon the actor to control the third person's
  conduct, or (b) a special relation ... between
  the actor and the other which gives to the other
  a right of protection." (Tarasoff v. Regents of
  University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425,
  435)

38
DUTY OF ONE IN IMMINENT PERIL

• A person who, without negligence on his or her
  part, is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted
  with peril arising from either the actual
  presence of, or the appearance of, imminent
  danger to him or herself or to others, is not
  expected nor required to use the same judgment
  and prudence that is required in the exercise of
  ordinary care in calmer and more deliberate
  moments.

39
DUTY OF ONE IN IMMINENT PERIL(Continued)

• His or her duty is to exercise the care that an
  ordinarily prudent person would exercise in the
  same or similar circumstances. If at that moment
  he or she does what appears to him or her to be
  the best thing to do, and if his or her choice
  and manner of action are the same as might have
  been followed by any ordinarily prudent person
  under the same conditions, he or she does all the
  law requires of him or her. This is true even
  though in the light of after-events, it should
  appear that a different course would have been
  better and safer.

40
RESPONSIBILITY OF ONE CAUSING THE PERILOUS
SITUATION

• When a situation of peril such as that described
  above is caused by someone's negligence, and the
  person in peril, acting under the impulse of
  fear, makes an instinctive and reasonable effort
  to escape and, in so doing, injures himself or
  herself or a third person, the negligence that
  caused the peril is deemed to be a cause of the
  injury. This is true even though it might have
  appeared, or after the event it may appear, from
  the viewpoint of another person, that the effort
  to escape was unwise or that the person in danger
  would not have been injured no one would have
  been injured if that effort had not been made or
  had been made differently.

41
VOLUNTARY UNDERTAKING--"GOOD SAMARITAN" RULE

• A person who is under no duty to care for or
  render service to another but who voluntarily
  assumes such a duty, is liable to the other for
  injury caused by a failure to exercise ordinary
  or reasonable care in the performance of that
  assumed duty.

42
Good Samaritan Rule

• n. from a Biblical story, if a volunteer comes
  to the aid of an injured or ill person who is a
  stranger, the person giving the aid owes the
  stranger a duty of being reasonably careful. In
  some circumstances negligence could result in a
  claim of negligent care if the injuries or
  illness were made worse by the volunteer's
  negligence. Thus, if Jack Goodguy sees a man
  lying by the road, a victim of a hit and run
  accident, and moves the injured man, resulting in
  a worsening of the injury or a new injury,
  instead of calling for an ambulance, Goodguy may
  find himself on the wrong end of a lawsuit for
  millions of dollars.

43
THE RESCUE DOCTRINE--LIABILITY TO RESCUER

• In general, there is no duty to come to the aid
  or rescue of a stranger unless, the rescuer
  negligently created the situation which put the
  stranger in peril and necessitated the rescue.
  The essential elements of the rescue doctrine
  are
• 1. The defendant engaged in negligent conduct
• 2. Such conduct threatened real and imminent
  serious harm to the person or property of
  another

44
THE RESCUE DOCTRINE--LIABILITY TO RESCUER
(Continued)

• 3. The plaintiff attempted to rescue the
  endangered person or property
• 4. In attempting such rescue, the plaintiff
  suffered injury, damage, loss or harm and
• 5. The defendant's negligence was a cause of the
  rescue attempt and of the injuries or damage
  sustained by plaintiff in the course of such
  rescue attempt.

45
Rescue Doctrine

• n.
• The rule of law that if a rescuer of a person
  hurt or put in peril due to the negligence or
  intentional wrongdoing of another (the
  tortfeasor) is injured in the process of the
  rescue, the original wrongdoer is responsible in
  damages for the rescuer's injury. Example Sydney
  Sparetire speeds on a mountain highway, and skids
  in front of Victor Victim, running Victim's car
  off the bank, trapping Victim in the vehicle.
  Raymond Rightguy stops, ties a rope to the grill
  of his car, slides down and extricates Victim,
  but on the way up slips and breaks his arm, and
  then finds the grill is badly bent. The negligent
  Sparetire is liable to Rightguy for his broken
  arm (including medical expenses, loss of wages
  and general damages for pain and suffering) as
  well as the property damage to the car grill.

46
OTHER SITUATIONS GIVING RISE TO DUTY

• Restatement Second of Torts Section 388 outlines
  the requirements for imposing liability on one
  who supplies a chattel which is known to be
  dangerous for its intended use. No duty can exist
  under section 388 unless defendant supplies a
  chattel to defendant to use.

47
Chattel

• n. an item of personal property which is movable,
  as distinguished from real property (land and
  improvements).

48
OTHER SITUATIONS GIVING RISE TO DUTY (Continued)

• A travel agent has a duty to disclose reasonably
  obtainable material information to the traveler
  unless that information is so clearly obvious and
  apparent to the traveler that, as a matter of
  law, the travel agent would not be negligent in
  failing to disclose it. (McCollum v. Friendly
  Hills Travel Ctr. (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 83, 945.)

49
DUTY OF CARE - OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND

• The common law determined what duty of care an
  owner of land owed to those coming upon the land
  by classifying the plaintiff either as a
  trespasser, licensee, or invitee and then
  adopting special rules as to the duty owed by the
  possessor to each of the classifications.
  Generally speaking a trespasser is a person who
  enters or remains upon land of another without a
  privilege to do so a licensee is a person like a
  social guest who is not an invitee and who is
  privileged to enter or remain upon land by virtue
  of the possessor's consent, and an invitee is a
  business visitor who is invited or permitted to
  enter or remain on the land for a purpose
  directly or indirectly connected with business
  dealings between them. (Oettinger v. Stewart, 24
  Cal.2d 133, 136 156 A.L.R. 1221.)

50
DUTY OF CARE - OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND
(Continued)

• Although the inviter owed the invitee a duty to
  exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring him
  (Oettinger v. Stewart, supra, 24 Cal.2d 133, 137
  Hinds v. Wheadon, 19 Cal.2d 458, 460-461), the
  general rule was that a trespasser and licensee
  or social guest were obliged to take the premises
  as they find them insofar as any alleged
  defective condition thereon may exist, and that
  the possessor of the land owed them only the duty
  of refraining from wanton or willful injury.
  (Palmquist v. Mercer, 43 Cal.2d 92, 102 see
  Oettinger v. Stewart, supra, 24 Cal.2d 133, 137
  et seq.) The ordinary justification for the
  general rule severely restricting the occupier's
  liability to social guests is based on the theory
  that the guest should not expect special
  precautions to be made on his account and that if
  the host does not inspect and maintain his
  property the guest should not expect this to be
  done on his account. Most courts have now
  rejected the rigid common law classifications and
  instead approach the issue of the duty of the
  occupier on the basis of ordinary principles of
  negligence.

51
Negligence - Causation In Fact - Proximate or
Legal Cause

• CAUSE--SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
• In tort law "cause" is a term of art. A legal
  cause of injury, damage, loss or harm is
  something that is a substantial factor in
  bringing about an injury, damage, loss or harm.
  "An actor may be liable if his negligence is a
  substantial factor in causing an injury." (Vesely
  v. Sager 5 Cal.3d 153.)

52
CAUSE

• from Latin causa 1) v. to make something happen.
  2) n. the reason something happens. A cause
  implies what is called a "causal connection" as
  distinguished from events which may occur but do
  not have any effect on later events. Example
  While driving his convertible, Johnny Youngblood
  begins to stare at pretty Sally Golightly, who is
  standing on the sidewalk. While so distracted he
  veers into a car parked at the curb. Johnny's
  inattention (negligence) is the cause of the
  accident, and neither Sally nor her beauty is the
  cause. 3) n. short for cause of action.

53
PROXIMATE CAUSE

• The question of legal responsibility is commonly
  considered in terms of "proximate cause," which
  is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of
  causation, but with the various considerations of
  policy that limit an actor's responsibility for
  the consequences of his conduct. (See, Prosser,
  Torts, pp. 311-313.) A proximate cause of an
  injury is a cause which, in natural and
  continuous sequence, produces the injury, and
  without which the injury would not have occurred.
  "The concept of proximate causation has given
  courts and commentators consummate difficulty and
  has in truth defied precise definition." (State
  Compensation Ins. Fund v. Ind. Acc. Comm. 176
  Cal.App.2d 10, 20.)

54
PROXIMATE CAUSE (Continued)

• In the Polemis Case (1921, 3 K. B. 560),
  defendant's worker carelessly allowed a plank to
  fall into the hold of the ship. The falling plank
  struck something and thereby caused a spark which
  in its turn ignited gasoline vapor in the hold.
  The vapor caused a fire which destroyed the whole
  ship. Held The fire was not a reasonably
  foreseeable consequence of allowing the plank to
  fall. However, it was reasonably foreseeable that
  the falling plank would cause some form of damage
  to the vessel.

55
PROXIMATE CAUSE (Continued)

• Because of this, the court established
  defendant's negligence. Whether the particular
  damage caused by the fire was recoverable
  depended solely on it being a direct consequence
  of the negligent act. Although the damage by fire
  could not have reasonably been foreseen as a
  consequence of dropping the plank, Defendant was
  therefore liable for the loss of the ship by fire.

56
PROXIMATE CAUSE (Continued)

• In Wagon Mound 1 (Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd.
  v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. 1961 1
  All E.R. 404 1961 A.C. 388 1961 2 W.L.R.
  126 (P.C.) and Wagon Mound 2 (Overseas Tankship
  (U.K.) Ltd. v. The Miller Steamship Co. Pty.
  (1966), 1966 2 All E.R. 709 1967 1 A.C. 617
  1966 3 W.L.R. 498 (P.C.) the wind and tide
  carried the oil beneath a wharf where welding
  operations were being carried on by employees.
  After being advised that they could safely weld,
  the employees continued their work. Some 55 to 60
  hours after the original discharge, molten metal
  set some waste floating in the oil on fire. The
  flames quickly developed into a large fire which
  severely damaged the wharf.

57
Wagon Mound (Continued)

• Liability turned on the question of whether the
  risk of fire was foreseeable, since furnace oil
  has such a high boiling point it is unlikely to
  catch fire under normal circumstances. In Wagon
  Mound 1 and 2, the two sequential claimants
  argued the risks of fire in opposite ways. Each
  of these diametrically different presentations of
  the risk of fire was accepted by the very same
  court as equally true and valid facts. The upshot
  of the two Wagon Mound cases is that a defendant
  will only be liable for damage that is reasonably
  foreseeable as a consequence of the negligent
  act. Foreseeable damage being "real or very
  likely " - not far-fetched or fanciful."

58
CONCURRING CAUSES

• There may be more than one cause of an injury.
  When negligent or wrongful conduct of two or more
  persons or negligent or wrongful conduct and a
  defective product contributes concurrently as
  causes of an injury, the conduct of each is a
  cause of the injury regardless of the extent to
  which each contributes to the injury. A cause is
  concurrent if it was operative at the moment of
  injury and acted with another cause to produce
  the injury. It is no defense that the negligent
  wrongful conduct of a person not joined as a
  party was also a cause of the injury.

59
The End For Now

• Next Lecture Begins With
• Strict LiabilityProducts Liability Ultra
  Hazardous Activity