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Title: The Court of Justice of the European Communities: a melting pot of legal cultures


1
The Court of Justice of the European
Communitiesa melting pot of legal cultures
Judith Turnbull
Seminario permanente Lionello R. Levi
Sandri 12-13 novembre 2009
2
Court of Justice of the European Communities
  • 27 Judges
  • 8 Advocates General
  • Judges and Advocates General are appointed from
    all Member States

3
Advocates General
  • sit independently
  • assist judges in Court
  • attend the preliminary meeting and hearing
  • present an Opinion to the Court before the panel
    of judges deliberates
  • Opinion is purely advisory

4
Corpus
  • 40 Opinions of Advocates General 1998-2008
  • (20 British 20 Italian )
  • Only two British Advocates General
  • Four Italian Advocates General
  • Total number of words 310,162
  • (Br. 129,625 It. 180,537)
  • Opinions range in length from 2500 to 21000 words

5
Role of judges in the English and Italian legal
systems
  • Common law system
  • Judges interpret and can create the law
  • (precedents and judge-made law)
  • Civil law system
  • Judges act as officials of the law and apply
    it as written in the codes

6
Style of English and Italian judgments
  • English judgments are described as
    conversational, combative or rhetorical
    (Lord Hope of Craighead 2005)
  • Italian judgments are conceived and written as
    bureaucratic documents. it is a document which
    is not written by a judge, but by the body of the
    law and the motivazione is not an apology of
    the judge that has reached a decision, but the
    formal explanation of an impersonal decision.
    (Taruffo1988).

7
Morpho-syntactic and lexical characteristics of
English judgments
  • Morpho-syntactic characteristics
  • relatively simple sentence structure (if long,
    parenthetically connected)
  • very frequent use of hypothetical propositions to
    represent the reasoning of the judge
  • extensive use of pronouns and personal adjectives
    (especially 1st person)
  • use of certain rhetorical forms, as for example,
    direct questions, direct speech, recapitulation
  • Lexical characteristics
  • frequent use of modality expressions (modal
    verbs, adverbs and adverbial phrases)
  • use of emotionally intensive lexis

  • (Scarpa and
    Riley 2000)

8
Morpho-syntactic and lexical characteristics of
Italian judgments
  • Morpho-syntactic characteristics
  • adjective or past participle positioned before
    the noun (in concreto incidente, per il
    dichiarato intento)
  • simple prepositions instead of articulated
    prepositions (oltre a rivalutazione)
  • frequent use of the passive, often together with
    the gerund (non potendosi desumere, non essendo
    stato il documento confermato)
  • hypotaxis, long and complex sentences, with
    frequent use of embedded phrases, especially to
    define terms
  • systematic inversion of subject-verb into
    verb-subject (ritiene il collegio diversificare)
  • object is placed before the verb (a soggetto che
    tale attività svolge)
  • leftward movement of parts of speech (adverbs,
    numbers, agents, past participle in initial
    position)
  • use of imperfect with a narrative function (to
    describe the proceedings)
  • use of present participle
  • use of clitics
  • Lexical characteristics
  • use of Latin expressions
  • formulaic language
  • use of rare words and archaisms
  • redundant stereotypical phrases
    (Scarpa and Riley
    2000 Rega 1997)

9
Table 1 Personal pronouns and adjectives

Table 1 Number of occurrences of 1st person
sing. and pl. verb forms, pronouns and adjectives
10
Table 2 Most frequently occurring verbs in the
1st personthe first 15 of the 70 verbs in the
British corpus and of the 50 verbs in the Italian
corpus
11
Table 3 Expressions with 1st person possessive
adjectives my and mi/o/a/ei/e
12
Structure of English and Italian judgments

13
Structure of Opinions
  • Question. Relevant
  • legislation
  • (community and national)
  • Facts and procedure
  • Assessment
  • Conclusions
  • Introduzione. Quadro normativo
  • Fatti, questioni pregiudiziali
  • Analisi giuridica
  • Conclusioni

14
Complexity of Opinions
  • Example of English Opinion
  • Example of Italian Opinion
  • Origins of case
  • Community law-Parent/subsidiary Directive
  • Relevant Belgian law
  • Implementation of Parent/Subsidiary
    Directive
  • Usufruct in Belgian law
  • Facts and the question referred
  • Admissibility
  • Insufficient information
  • Absence of Community element
  • Substance
  • Must the directive apply to a right of
    usufruct?
  • The aim of the directive
  • The scheme of the directive
  • The wording of the directive
  • May the Directive apply to a right of
    usufruct?
  • Conclusion
  • (C-48/07)
  • Introduzione
  • Contesto normativo
  • Causa principale e questioni pregiudiziali
  • Sulle questioni pregiudiziali
  • A. Osservazioni preliminari
  • B. Sulle prime 4 questioni relative
    allinter-pretazione della NC (nomenclatura
    combinata)
  • -Considerazioni introduttive
  • -Argomenti delle parti
  • -Valutazioni a) osservazioni generali
  • b) Sulla nota 5 del
    capitolo84 della NC
  • (i), (ii),
    (iii).
  • c) Sulla nota 3 della
    Sezione XVI
  • d) Sulla regola n. 3
    (i), (ii),
  • e) Conclusioni
    parziali
  • C. Sulla validità del regolamento n. 400/2006
  • -Argomenti delle parti
  • -Valutazione
  • Conclusioni
  • (C-362/07)

15
Personal
  • 58. I am not, however, persuaded by either
    of the above arguments that my understanding of
    the Directive is misconceived. It is settled
    case-law that Community legislation must be
    interpreted not solely on the basis of its
    wording, but also in the light of the overall
    scheme and objectives of the system of which it
    is a part. (38) I have explained above what I
    consider to be the scheme and objectives of the
    Directive and why my interpretation of its
    provisions is consistent therewith. The concepts
    of a holding in the capital of a company and
    a parent companys association with its
    subsidiary must be understood in that context,
    which is again not primarily a company law
    context. (C-48/07)

16
Evaluative (and personal) language
  • In so saying, the national court made two correct
    statements and one significant error. The
    Community arrangements for market support in the
    agricultural sector do indeed all depend,
    correctly, upon making sure that those claiming
    support comply with the necessary conditions laid
    down by the Community regulations. The wine and
    grape producers were indeed the intended
    ultimate recipients of the aid. However, it
    seems to me that, on a proper construction of
    Regulation No 2499/82, the distillers (DAI) were
    not, in any true sense, the intended recipients
    of the aid in so far as concerns the minimum
    buying-in price. Rather, they were the conduit
    through which that aid was intended provided
    that the wine duly entered the distillery and was
    distilled to be transmitted to the wine
    producers.(C-51/05 P)

17
Bureaucratic
  • 82. Più in generale, emerge dalla giurisprudenza
    che la sussistenza del requisito di selettività
    deve fare loggetto di una valutazione caso per
    caso, mirata a verificare se la misura di cui
    trattasi, conto tenuto della sua natura, del suo
    ambito di applicazione, delle sue modalità di
    attuazione e dei suoi effetti, comporti o no
    vantaggi a esclusivo profitto di talune imprese o
    di taluni settori di attività (38). Ove sia
    accertata la sussistenza di un siffatto
    vantaggio, anche la non imposizione di un nuovo
    tributo a determinati operatori economici può
    costituire un aiuto ai sensi dellart. 87, n. 1,
    CE (39). (C-487/06)

18
Natural
34. La cittadinanza irlandese di Catherine,
dunque, è elemento sufficiente a escludere che la
controversia che la oppone, assieme alla madre,
al Secretary of State sia puramente interna
allordinamento britannico. 35. Ad una
conclusione diversa si potrebbe eventualmente
pervenire solo ove si ritenesse che Catherine non
possieda effettivamente la cittadinanza
irlandese, o che comunque il possesso di quella
cittadinanza non sia opponibile al governo del
Regno Unito. 36. Devo tuttavia notare che in
nessuna fase della procedura, né di fronte al
giudice nazionale né di fronte alla Corte, è mai
stato messo in dubbio che la piccola Catherine
possegga effettivamente la cittadinanza
irlandese, come del resto non è stata contestata
dal governo del Regno Unito la legittimità, dal
punto di vista del diritto internazionale o
comunitario, dellattribuzione di quella
cittadinanza da parte dello Stato irlandese. 37.
Così stando le cose, non è necessario prendere
posizione sullesistenza o meno di una norma di
diritto internazionale generale secondo cui
nessuno Stato sarebbe tenuto a riconoscere la
cittadinanza attribuita ad un singolo da un altro
Stato, in assenza di un legame reale ed effettivo
dellindividuo con lo Stato nazionale (8).
(C-200/02)
19
Impersonal
37. This aspect has not been discussed before the
Court in great detail, and it would not be
appropriate to express a definitive view which
should be based on a full appreciation of
national circumstances. However, the contested
amendment appears to mean that the rule
precluding reimbursement where the burden of the
tax has been passed on applies to all categories
of claimant but one those who have brought
proceedings before the Verfassungsgerichtshof
challenging a tax declared unconstitutional by
that court. 38. If it is the case that
entitlement to benefit from Anlaßfallwirkung is
confined to those bringing challenges under
national constitutional law, then the rules
governing reimbursement of taxes found
incompatible with national law might be more
favourable, in that regard, than in the case of
taxes found incompatible with Community law. 39.
For the amendment to comply with the principle of
equivalence, it would be necessary either for the
benefit of the exception to be extended to all
those who have challenged a tax found to be
incompatible with Community law or for the
exception to be abolished entirely.(C-147/01)
20
Signposting
  • A mio avviso, la misura adottata
    dall'amministrazione danese offende le
    disposizioni del Trattato in materia di libero
    stabilimento. Come meglio spiegherò, essa non
    restringe semplicemente l'esercizio del diritto
    di stabilimento secondario riconosciuto alle
    società straniere comunitarie, ma lo preclude
    radicalmente.
  • (C-212/97 )

21
Signposting 2
31. Credo però che lobiezione non possa essere
accolta. 32. Ricordo anzitutto che, secondo la
costante giurisprudenza comunitaria, il possesso
della cittadinanza di uno Stato membro diverso da
quello in cui una persona risiede è elemento
sufficiente a determinare lapplicazione delle
disposizioni del diritto comunitario, anche
quando la persona che invoca quelle disposizioni
non abbia mai varcato le frontiere dello Stato
membro in cui risiede (5). 33. In particolare,
nella recente sentenza Garcia Avello, dopo aver
ricordato che la cittadinanza dellUnione,
sancita dallart. 17 CE, non ha () lo scopo di
ampliare la sfera di applicazione ratione
materiae del Trattato a situazioni nazionali che
non abbiano alcun collegamento con il diritto
comunitario (6), la Corte ha avuto modo di
chiarire che . 34. La cittadinanza irlandese
di Catherine, dunque, è elemento sufficiente a
escludere che la controversia che la oppone,
assieme alla madre, al Secretary of State sia
puramente interna allordinamento britannico.
35. Ad una conclusione diversa si potrebbe
eventualmente pervenire solo ove si ritenesse che
Catherine non possieda effettivamente la
cittadinanza irlandese, o che comunque il
possesso di quella cittadinanza non sia
opponibile al governo del Regno Unito. 36. Devo
tuttavia notare che in nessuna fase della
procedura, né di fronte al giudice nazionale né
di fronte alla Corte, è mai stato messo in dubbio
che la piccola Catherine possegga effettivamente
la cittadinanza irlandese, come del resto non è
stata contestata dal governo del Regno Unito la
legittimità, dal punto di vista del diritto
internazionale o comunitario, dellattribuzione
di quella cittadinanza da parte dello Stato
irlandese. 37. Così stando le cose, non è
necessario prendere posizione sullesistenza o
meno di una norma di diritto internazionale
generale secondo cui nessuno Stato sarebbe tenuto
a riconoscere la cittadinanza attribuita ad un
singolo da un altro Stato, in assenza di un
legame reale ed effettivo dellindividuo con lo
Stato nazionale (8). 38. Mi limito a ricordare
che, per quanto attiene allordinamento
comunitario, la Corte ha affermato nelle sentenze
Micheletti (9) e Kaur (10) che la determinazione
dei modi di acquisto e di perdita della
cittadinanza rientra, in conformità al diritto
internazionale, nella competenza di ciascuno
Stato membro (11), e che pertanto non spetta
() alla legislazione di uno Stato membro
limitare gli effetti dellattribuzione della
cittadinanza di un altro Stato membro,
pretendendo un requisito ulteriore per il
riconoscimento di tale cittadinanza al fine
dellesercizio delle libertà fondamentali
previste dal Trattato (12). 39. Mi sembra
pertanto di poter concludere che, in
considerazione della cittadinanza irlandese della
piccola Catherine, la controversia pendente
davanti allImmigration Authority rientra in
linea di principio nellambito di applicazione
del Trattato e che leccezione di irricevibilità
sollevata dal governo del Regno Unito deve quindi
essere respinta. (C-200/02)
22
Hypothesising 87.   . As a result, this Court
was not given the opportunity, at that stage, of
examining the structure and purpose of Regulation
No 2499/82. Had it done so, it seems to me likely
that it would have reached the same conclusion as
has the Court of First Instance, namely that
there was a lacuna in Regulation No 2499/82
leading to different treatment of wine producers
depending upon whether their Member State had
chosen the Article 9 or the Article 10 procedure
that the difference in treatment was not
justified and that responsibility for that
violation lay with the Community institution that
had drafted Regulation No 2499/82, i.e. the
Commission. (45) Although the answers given to
the national court would (inevitably) have led to
the applicants failing to recover the Community
aid due to them through their intervention in the
national proceedings, they would then objectively
have known that the claim lay against the
Commission. Time would clearly, therefore, have
run against them from that point for the purposes
of bringing an action for compensation under
Article 235 EC. 88.      It is possible that
the national court paid less than full attention
to the wine producers interests because they
were interveners in DAIs action, rather than
applicants in their own name. It seems to me that
it would be rather harsh to fault the producers,
in the circumstances, for not bringing separate
proceedings, presumably against DAI (since it was
the distiller who actually owed them the balance
of the Community aid payable) with AIMA and
perhaps Assedile as additional defendants. As it
was, there was already a relevant action (between
DAI and AIMA) that was live before the national
courts. It would have seemed rather natural, in
the interests of procedural efficiency and
economy, to intervene in that action and to place
the wine producers entitlement to payment of
their Community aid before the national court in
that way. Had DAI succeeded, or lost following a
reference, they would (respectively) have either
had a better chance of being paid the aid by DAI
or at least known where they stood. If it was an
error to intervene in those proceedings rather
than to commence separate proceedings, it seems
to me that that error was objectively excusable.
(C-51/05)
23
Hypothesising 2
  • 96.      It seems to me that those two limbs
    could equally well have been phrased (and might
    perhaps have been more felicitously phrased) in
    terms of what a reasonable bystander, observing
    the situation, would have supposed the objective
    situation to be. Objectively, looking at the
    Community legislation, the quasi-contractual
    relations between AIMA and the wine producers,
    the fact that the wine producers had complied
    with their obligations and the apparent purpose
    of the Community legislation as expressed in the
    recitals to Regulation No 2499/82, it seems to me
    that such a bystander would have supposed that
    the proper course of redress was by way of
    proceedings before the national court to obtain
    payment of the Community aid with, in all
    probability, a reference under Article 234 EC.
    I find it difficult to accept the idea that a
    reasonable bystander, viewing the situation
    objectively, would have jumped to the conclusion
    in 1983 that the wine producers should launch a
    damages claim against the Commission.
  • 97.  I consider that such a bystander would
    have said that, although the general nature of
    the damage that the applicants were likely to
    suffer if they were not paid the Community aid
    might be obvious in June 1983, its unavoidable
    nature was not
  • (C-51/05)

24
Conclusions ?
  • Italian Opinions
  • extensive use of personalized forms
  • less variation in expression, hence more
    formulaic
  • British Opinions
  • fairly frequent use of impersonal discourse
  • writers position is not always explicit

25
Two Anecdotes
  • L'inadempienza imputata all'Irlanda, se la Corte
    ritiene di doverla dichiarare per le ragioni da
    me proposte, non comporta necessariamente,
    ripeto, che le soglie oggetto di censura debbano
    essere necessariamente abbassate ad altro livello
    e la Commissione non ha d'altronde precisato a
    quale altro livello come se quella fosse la
    sola via per passare, al pari di Alice nel paese
    delle meraviglie, attraverso un magico uscio.
    (C-392/96)
  • It was characterised by simplicity of structure
    and economy of language that is typical of the
    judgments issued by the ECJ The style was
    distinctive precisely because it was so
    disciplined ... (Lord Hope of Craighead 2005 1)
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