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Maritime Security Planning: Security Beyond The Container. Major Shipping Areas That Are Not Contain

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Identified high interest vessels and prioritized critical infrastructure ... The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) The New People's Army (NPA) Increase in Piracy ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Maritime Security Planning: Security Beyond The Container. Major Shipping Areas That Are Not Contain


1
Maritime Security Planning Security Beyond The
Container. Major Shipping Areas That Are Not
Containerized Maritime Piracy and Protection of
Offshore Petroleum and Gas Facilities
  • Ed Badolato
  • Executive VP, Homeland Security
  • The Shaw Group
  • IDGA
  • Long Beach, CA
  • 26 May 2004

2
Major Non-Containerized Shipping Programs
  • Tankers
  • Pirates
  • Offshore Platforms

3
Improving Security of the Tanker Fleet
4
U.S. Coast Guard Initiatives
  • Identified high interest vessels and prioritized
    critical infrastructure
  • Established Maritime Security (MARSEC) levels
  • Increased the Advanced Notice of Arrival
    Information (NOA) time for commercial vessels
    arriving from foreign ports from 24 to 96 hours
  • Instituted a Sea Marshal program for high-risk
    ports

5
HIGH INTEREST VESSELS
6
Maritime Security (MARSEC)
7
Oil Tanker Choke Points
  • Strait of Hormuz
  • Strait of Malacca
  • Bab el-Mandab
  • Bosporus/Turkish Straits
  • Panama Canal and Trans-Panama Pipeline
  • Russian Oil and Gas Export Pipelines/Ports
  • Suez Canal and SUMED Pipeline

8
Irans Missile Boats in Hormuz
  • Oil Tanker Interdiction Strategy
  • New Chinese C-14 high speed catamaran Patrol
    Boats with 8 C-701 anti ship cruise missiles
  • 1995 40 Hudong Chinese fast attack missile boats
    with 80 C-802 missiles Jan 02 short range
    missile shipment

9
Staying Ahead of Terrorist High Tech Initiatives
10
USS Cole Limburg
11
USS Cole and the MT Limburg Attacks.
  • The asymmetric threat--using a small 1,000 boats
    to destroy a large costly ships
  • Increasing the scope of risks facing the oil
    lifeline
  • Maritime insurers immediately tripled the
    premiums they charged tankers passing through
    Yemeni waters

12
Limburg
  • The al Qaeda network was suspected in the Limburg
    attack.
  • The allies of the United States would pay a
    heavy bill from their blood and interests, and
    the Limburg mission was to supply the 5th Fleet
    based in Bahrain for striking the brothers in
    Iraq.
  • --The Yemen based Aden-Abyan Islamic Group that
    claimed responsibility for the attack

13
Sea Marshal Program
14
Industry Security-Related Programs
  • Energy Information Sharing and Analysis Center
    (ISAC)
  • National Infrastructure Protection Center (NPIC)
  • National Petroleum Council (NPC)
  • American Petroleum Institute
  • Site Security Guidelines for the US Chemical
    Industry
  • American Chemistry Council
  • Chlorine Institute
  • Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing
    Association

15
TANKER PRECAUTIONARY SECURITY MEASURES
  • Assign ship's Physical Security officer
  • Develop and exercise the ships security plan
  • While in port and within threat areas
  • increase roving deck patrol frequency.
  • Secure all restricted spaces and unsupervised
    access points onboard the ship Ensure night
    illumination to ship bows, sides, and quarters. 
  • During radio contact with port officials
    ascertain small boat operations near and around
    the vessel
  • Establish radio contact and verify business of
    nearby small boats
  • In high-threat areas or during passage of
    confined waters. 
  • Consider daylight passage
  • Have fire/water hoses laid out and maintained
    under pressure with nozzles ready in high threat
    areas.
  • ISLP Requirements

16
Ferry Attack
  • Fire raced through the R.P. Superferry 14 on
    Friday (27 Feb 2004) shortly after it left Manila
    for central and southern islands, killing one
    person and injuring 12 others. Subsequent reports
    indicated that at least 180 others were "missing"
    following the incident. Witnesses reported a
    powerful explosion that sparked an inferno on the
    ferry.

17
Maritime Piracy
18
Piracy
  • "An act of boarding or attempting to board any
    ship with the intent to commit theft or any other
    crime and with the intent or capability to use
    force in the furtherance of that act.
  • the IMB

19
(No Transcript)
20
Major terrorist groups in Southeast Asia
  • Terrorist groups are active in four countries
    Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the
    Philippines.
  • Jemaah Islamiah (JI)
  • Laskar Jihad (LJ)
  • Islamic Defenders Front (FPI)
  • Abu Sayyaf (Bearer of the Sword)
  • The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
  • The New Peoples Army (NPA)

21
Increase in Piracy
  • Attacks rose by 57 in early 2004 and 8 ships
    were hijacked
  • 165 actual and attempted pirate attacks and
    incidents were recorded throughout the world
  • 72 seafarers killed and 99 injured in Year 2000.
  • Ships were boarded in 307 instances in 2001
  • Asian waters continued to be the most
    treacherous with 61 of the attacks taking place
    in just five locales Indonesia, Malacca Straits,
    Malaysia, Bangladesh and India.
  • The International Maritime Bureau's Piracy
    Reporting Center

22
2002 Attacks by Vessel Type
  • Tankers 25
  • Cargo Vessels 23
  • Fishing Vessels 16
  • Bulk Carriers 13
  • Coastal Vessels 12
  • Container Ships 11
  • For detailed attack information see
  • http//marisec.org/piracy/reported20attacks.htm

23
Four Categories of Piracy
  • Petty Theft and Robbery (Petty thefts are
    excluded from IMB reporting, unless the thieves
    are armed.)
  • Armed Robbery
  • Hi-jacking of Cargo
  • Hi-jacking of Ships (to ransom the vessel itself
    and/or its crew/passengers)

24
Todays Modern Pirates
  • Sophisticated syndicates
  • Target shipping, ships and cargoes.
  • Gather pre-attack intelligence, conduct
    surveillance, and subvert people.
  • Steal ships and reflag, using them either for
    their own purposes or to sell.

25
Five steps to put a phantom ship to work
Repaint, Rename, Reregister
  • Pirate insiders look for Shipping Agent with a
    nearly expired LOC.
  • Offer services of their ship
  • Illegally obtain registration certificatea new
    official identity
  • The ship is loaded and the shipper receives a
    bill of lading
  • Pirates sail to destination different from BOL,
    unload and sell cargo, change registration, start
    over

26
MARITIME PIRACY AND TERRORISM
  • Terrorist attacks against maritime targets take
    place in areas where piracy is also rife--Yemen
    and the Philippines.
  • Common denominators are
  • Geography that yields advantages to attackers
  • Insufficient maritime law enforcement
    capabilities
  • Environment of lawlessness
  • Maritime equivalent of a liberated zone

27
Piracy-related Crime
  • Theft
  • Extortion
  • Human Smuggling
  • Narco-terrorism
  • Arms Smuggling

28
Precautions Against Insiders
  • The majority of employees, like most of society
    are honest, but experience has shown that the
    possibility of insider involvement in piracy
    can't be ignored.
  • PRECAUTIONS
  • Security
  • Legal
  • Medical
  • Employee Groups

29
Improving Defense Against Catastrophic Threats
30
Offshore Platforms Facilities
31
Protection of Offshore Facilities
  • Protection of Oil Platforms and Key Facilities
  • Principally diver/swimmer/SDV detection, stealthy
    surface vessels
  • Terrorists Threats

32
Off Shore Threats Terrorists, Saboteurs, and
Environmental Extremists Using Surface Craft,
Diving Gear, or Small Submarines
33
Suspicious Diver Incidents
  • A recent FBI bulletin sent to state and local law
    enforcement agencies warned that "various
    terrorist elements have sought to develop an
    offensive scuba diver capability."
  • 1. A diver, found dead, in the Hudson River near
    the Indian Point nuclear power plant (24 Feb
    2004)
  • 2. A diver, found dead, off John U. Lloyd State
    Park in Dania Beach, FL, Feb 2004
  • 3. A diver seen by a USCG sentry near a 47-foot
    patrol boat moored at the Sand Island base in
    Honolulu Harbor (29 Feb 2004)

34
Port Suicide Bombers, March 04
  • Ashdod port attack
  • Two teenage suicide bombers from Gaza
  • Killed 10 people

35
Protection of offshore oil and gas platforms
poses unique challenges
  • Many are unattended or have no security force
  • Require surveillance systems, lethal, and
    non-lethal weapons systems to detect and defend
    against a variety of threats

36
Detection and Tracking of Offshore Threats
  • Surface and subsurface
  • Exclusion zones and auto alerting
  • Contact data transmitted to command center
  • Principally surface vessels, mini subs, Gunboats
    in deeper water

37
Monitoring Surveillance Systems
  • Pierside/platform diver protection systems
  • Coastal port diver protection systems
  • Generic Offshore Platforms monitoring undersea
    protection systems
  • Undersea arrays tripwire systems

38
Typical Offshore Platform Security Systems
  • Surface radars to automatically detect and track
    surface craft.
  • Video and infrared (IR) linked to radar tracks to
    view intruders detected by radar.
  • Underwater sonar to detect divers and submarines
  • A command and control system that displays images
    and data from radar, cameras and sonar for
    observers on the platform or on shore

39
Harbor Surveillance
  • High performance surface search Radar
  • CCTV and Infrared cameras (Thermal and Visual
    Imaging Systems)
  • Passive Acoustic/magnetic Tripwires
  • Diver detection sonar (high frequency active)

40
Harbor Protection
Loading Pier
Iraq Oil Loading Anchorage
Abu Dhabi Harbor
41
Indigenous Threats
  • Dhows
  • Fishing Boats

42
Contact Info
  • Edward Badolato
  • Executive VP of Homeland Security
  • edward.badolato_at_shawgrp.com
  • www.shawgrp.com
  • The Shaw Group
  • 1717 Pennsylvania Ave., 9th Fl.
  • Washington DC 20006
  • Phone 202.261.1910
  • Fax 202.261.1949
  • Cell 703.927.3965
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