SECURITY IN THE POSTCOLD WAR ERA and the potential role of quantitative methods in decision making

1
SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (and the
potential role of quantitative methods in
decision making)

• Los Angeles
• 15 February, 2006

William J. Perry Stanford University
David Alderson California Institute of Technology
2
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONS

• STAKES ARE HIGH
• PROBLEMS INCREDIBLY COMPLEX
• NEVER ENOUGH TIME OR DATA

3
LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE

• SEPARATE THE VARIABLES
• Apply analytical tools to one variable
• DEAL WITH STOCHASTIC VARIABLES
• Statistical uncertainty pervasive
• CONDUCT SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
• Given data is always wrong

4
LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN USING QUANTITATIVE METHODS
IN POLICY DECISIONS

• REAL UNCERTAINTIES IN DATA
• TOO LITTLE TIME FOR REFLECTION
• LITTLE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
• SENSITIVITY TO UNCERTAINTIES
• POLITICAL OR PERSONAL AGENDAS

5
NATIONAL SECURITY TODAY---THE LEGACY OF DESERT
STORM

• US MILITARY DOMINATES ALL OTHER MILITARY FORCES
• OTHER MAJOR POWERS MORE THAN A DECADE BEHIND
• REGIONAL POWERS HAVE NO CHANCE OF MATCHING
• BUT EVERY MEASURE HAS A COUNTERMEASURE

6
ASYMMETRIC WARFARE (Life is full of unintended
consequences)

• INSURGENCY WARFARE
• CYBERWARFARE---attack computers
  and commo links
• TERRORISM
• WEAPONS of MASS DESTRUCTION

7
INSURGENCY WARFARE

• In Desert Storm US forces had a great advantage
  in intel and PGMs
• In Iraq today insurgent forces may have the
  advantage in intel
• And PGMs are only useful if one knows where to
  direct them
• New tactics, weapons, and intel are needed to
  deal with insurgent operations

8
CYBER WARFARE

• Info networks as a central nervous system
• Exploitation via network is cheap and convenient
• Tools (laptop and network connection) are
  inexpensive
• Training is easily obtained or downloaded
• Detection, arrest, and prosecution are difficult
• Evolving landscape
• Rapidly changing technology, economics, and laws
• New potential vulnerabilities hackers, computer
  viruses, denial of service attacks
• Historical methods for protecting and assuring
  physical infrastructures are ill-suited for this
  new era
• An attractive target for asymmetric attack

9
WAR ON TERRORISM

• DIPLOMACYStop Nuclear Proliferation
• MILITARYTerrorist bases/Host Nations
• LAW ENFORCEMENTTerrorist cells
• INTELLIGENCEDetect terrorist plans
• TREASURY---Bottle up terrorist finances
• TRANSPORTATIONImprove travel safety
• Center for Disease Control---Vaccines,
  Antibiotics, Training of First Responders

10
WMD TERRORISM

• Al Qaeda has stated goal of killing millions of
  Americans
• 9-11 demonstrated they are serious
• To achieve this goal requires WMD
• OBL has stated that it is religious duty of his
  followers to get WMD
• We cannot with certainty prevent suicide bombers,
  but we can take actions to minimize risk of WMD
  terrorism

11
NUCLEAR TERRORISM

• Unlikely to stop nuclear bomb or fissile material
  from being shipped into US
• Consequence management has minimal affect after
  a nuclear detonation
• Best defense is keeping terror group from getting
  bomb or fissile material
• We know how to do that but it is not easy

12
LOOSE NUKES in EARLY 90s

• Cold War over, but still 20,000 nukes
• SU dissolved nukes in 4 countries
• These countries in some turbulence
• Congress passed Nunn-Lugar in 92
• I made its implementation top priority
• First step--denuclearizing former SSRs

13
(No Transcript)
14
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

• North Korea already has nuclear bombs may be
  building more
• Iran is developing the capacity to develop highly
  enriched uranium that could be used to make
  nuclear bombs
• Do either of these problems lend themselves to
  quantitative analysis?

15
Quantitative Analysis of a Hypothetical Problem

• Assumed facts are based on actual history of
  North Korean nuclear program
• The scenario, however, is purely hypothetical
• The hypothetical situation is invented to
  highlight importance of quantitative analysis,
  not as a prediction as to what will happen
• Numbers are not realistic (they were cooked up
  to make the problem interesting).
• The problem is oversimplified (i.e. overlooking
  the highly enriched uranium program) to make the
  calculations relatively easy

16

• US makes offer at 6-party meeting
• Non-first strike pledge
• Will sign treaty to end Korean War
• Will open interest office, and consider embassy
  at later date
• Will agree to NK reactor only after dismantlement
• All of this conditional on NK rejoining NPT and
  accepting anytime-anywhere challenge
  inspections
• NK counteroffer at 6-party meeting
• Offers dismantlement only after reactor delivered
• Offers to rejoin NPT inspection of Yongbyon by
  IAEA accepts one challenge inspection per year
• If counteroffer is not accepted NK threatens to
• break off talks
• ramp up production of plutonium (10 bombs per
  year) Sell products of their nuclear program

17
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEM

• NK crisis arises as a result of 6-party meeting
• President has called a Natl. Security meeting to
  decide what action he will direct
• Sec Def plans to recommend military action
• Sec State plans to recommend further diplomacy
• Presidents Guidance
• I will base my decision primarily on which
  alternative makes the better case for reducing
  the likelihood of a terrorist detonating a
  nuclear bomb in one of our cities as a result of
  bombs or fissile material obtained from NK

18
DECISION TWO ALTERNATIVES

• Alternative A SecDef
• Do not bargain away dismantlement and inspection
  provisions in US offer
• Do not allow further nukes to be built
• Authorize a military strike on Yongbyon to
  destroy all facilities---can be done with high
  confidence and with no US casualties.
• Alternative B SecState
• Accept NK counteroffer with only minor
  modifications
• Reactor can be attacked if NK does not fulfill
  agreement
• Our satellites (more open NK) provide adequate
  verif.

19
CIA Estimates

• NK has made 4 bombs Pu for 6 more p1
• Terrorist with nuke bomb is successful p0.5
• In response to Treaty
• NK turns in all Pu p1
• NK cheats, doesnt turn in bombs p0.3
• NK turns in bombs, but covertly builds more
  p0.2
• NK would sell bomb to terrorist p0.6
• In response to Attack
• All Pu is destroyed in attack p1
• 4 bombs survive attack p0.8
• NK would sell bomb to terrorist p0.4
• (p is low because NK cannot make more)

20
DECISION TREE
Terrorists Succeed
NK Sells Nuke
Terrorists Fail
0.5
Covertly Builds
0.7
NK Keeps Nuke
NK Turns Bombs In
expected success 86.8
0.94
No Covert Action
Diplomacy
Terrorists Succeed
0.868
NK Sells Nuke
0.5
Terrorists Fail
0.7
NK Keeps Bombs
NK Keeps Nuke
Terrorists Succeed
NK Sells Nuke
0.5
Terrorists Fail
Only Pu Destroyed
0.8
0.84
Attack
NK Keeps Nuke
expected success 84.0
Bombs Pu Destroyed
21
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

• Decision does not depend on Prob(Terrorists
  succeed)
• Decision does depend on beliefs about NK behavior

Prob(NK sells bombDiplomacy)
Prob(NK covertly builds bombsDiplomacy)
Individual table values are Prob(successDiplomacy
) (GREEN Diplomacy has higher expected success
RED Attack results in higher expected
success) All other input values assumed at their
nominal levels.
22
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (2)
Prob(bombs and Pu destroyedAttack)
Prob(NK sells bombAttack)
Individual table values are Prob(successAttack) (
GREEN Diplomacy has higher expected success
RED Attack results in higher expected success)
23
BIOTERRORISM

• Bioterrorism can be almost as deadly as nuclear
  terrorism (Dark Winter)
• Cannot prevent terror groups from getting bio
  agents (anthrax exists in farmyards)
• But Consequence Management can make a huge
  difference in fatalities
• Effective consequence mgt. must be planned,
  provisioned and practiced

24
SMALLPOX an abbreviated history

• 1949 last documented case of smallpox in US
• post-WWII large bioweapons effort by US, SU
• 1969 US unilaterally abandons program
• 1972 US halts systematic vaccination programs
• 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
• 1978 last global case of smallpox
• 1974-1991 Iraq operates bioweapons program
  North Korea believed to have one

TODAY unknown status of smallpox stockpiles,
highly susceptible US population
25
STAGES OF SMALLPOX INFECTION
asymptomatic non-infectious vaccine sensitive

• vaccine only effective lt 3 days after initial
  infection
• vaccine complications 3/106 (death in 40 of
  such cases)

3 days
incubating
asymptomatic non-infectious vaccine insensitive

• early detection isolation are most important
  for treatment

10-14 days

• aches, fever, rash, pustules
• spread by inhalation
• 1g smallpox can infect 100 people via aerosol

symptomatic infectious vaccine insensitive
symptomatic
3-5 days
symptomatic isolated deceased / immune

• no cure
• mortality rate 30

removed
14-17 days
26
DEBATE ON RESPONSE STRATEGY

• isolation who? when? how?
• vaccination who? when? how?
• how best to support a public health
  infrastructure with limited resources?
• stochastic models (Wein, et.al.)of disease
  transmission
• to understand the potential magnitude of attack
  scenarios
• to evaluate the efficacy of prevention and
  response strategies

27
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION 2

• FBI captures Al Qaeda operative at LAX who is in
  possession of a portable nebulizer containing
  enough variola (smallpox) virus to infect 1000
  people
• Upon questioning, the Al Qaeda operative reveals
  he was part of a plan with 4 other operatives who
  were to release the virus at 4 other national
  airports
• Unknown if operative is telling the truth

28
ASSUMED INITIAL RESPONSE

• FBI notifies DHS, CDCP, WHO to alert all
  hospitals and clinics to be on lookout for early
  symptoms of smallpox infection
• Distribution of smallpox vaccine to distribution
  centers all over the country
• Preparation for massive vaccination and
  quarantine program

29
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENTHYPOTHETICAL TWO-PART PLAN

• 1. massive vaccination program
• will involve taking over all public schools in
  the country for one day
• will use nearly the entire US stockpile
• 2. mandatory 10-day quarantine program
• for all people infected with smallpox
• for all people who refuse vaccination
• Estimated cost
• 40B for plan implementation
• 420 deaths (out of 300M) from vacc. side effects

30
DECISION TWO ALTERNATIVES

• Director of CDCP must advise President
• Alternative 1 initiate immediately the mass
  vaccination and quarantine program
• Alternative 2 delay implementation of program
  until confirmed appearance of smallpox

31
ASSUMED INPUTS
FOUR SCENARIOS
mass attack
1
vaccinate now
no attack
2
mass attack
3
wait
no attack
4
32

• 1st Generation Deaths
• 2nd Generation Deaths
• no vaccination
• recent vaccination
• 3rd Generation Deaths
• no vaccination
• recent vaccination
• Fatal Side Effects
• Total Deaths
• Cost of Deaths
• Cost of Plan
• Total Cost

1200 1500 350 0 0 420 3470 6.94 B 40
B 46.94 B
0 0 0 0 0 420 420 0.84 B 40 B 40.84 B
1200 12000 0 15000 3500 420 32120 64.24
B 40 B 104.24 B
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33
DECISION TREE
scenario
mass attack
1
vaccinate now
no attack
2
mass attack
3
wait
no attack
4
34
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (1)
base case
35
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS (2)

• Assuming we knew the Prob(attack) and actual
  Infection Rate, what would be the best policy?

Infection Rate
Probability of Attack
Values are cost of implementing the best policy
(in Billions of USD) (GREEN best policy is
INITIATE RED best policy is WAIT)
36
LITTLE EXPERIENCE IN USING QUANTITATIVE METHODS
IN POLICY DECISIONS

• REAL UNCERTAINTIES IN DATA
• TOO LITTLE TIME FOR REFLECTION
• LITTLE QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
• SENSITIVITY TO UNCERTAINTIES
• POLITICAL OR PERSONAL AGENDAS

37
ONGOING CHALLENGES

• WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
• CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
• networks as an asset, also a vulnerability
• enormous consequences (e.g. Northeast Blackout of
  Aug 2003)
• EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS RESPONSE
• disasters (natural man-made) will happen
• importance of consequence management

38
APPLYING LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE

• Define uncertainty in stochastic terms and seek
  to find bounds
• Setup analysis in general terms before problem
  becomes crisis
• Use quantitative analysis to frame problem and
  put bounds on decision
• Present analysis to decision maker with emphasis
  on sensitivity analysis

39
SECURITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA (and the
potential role of quantitative methods in
decision making)

• Los Angeles
• 15 February, 2006

William J. Perry Stanford University
David Alderson California Institute of Technology