Common Knowledge and Scientific Knowledge' Difference and Interdependence

1
Common Knowledge and Scientific
Knowledge.Difference and Interdependence

• Renata Zieminska
• Uniwersytet Szczecinski

2
Contents

• 1. Human knowledge in general
• 2. Science and scientific knowledge
• 3. Common knowledge as a kind of non-scientific
  knowledge
• 4. Difference and the demarcation problem
• 5. Interdependence (source and control,
  superiority and development)

3
1. Human knowledge in general

• Common knowledge and scientific knowledge are two
  kinds of human knowledge (justified true
  beliefs).
• There are two big philosophical problems
  concerning human knowledge
• the problem of its existence
• the problem of its definition
• Its existence was questioned by sceptics, its
  definition was recently discussed in Gettiers
  literature.

4
Scepticism

• The problem of scepticism (do any of our beliefs
  belong to real knowledge?) is connected with the
  way we understand knowledge.
• Ancient sceptics presumed that to know is to know
  with certainty in a conscious and rational way.
• Even contemporary sceptical hypothesis brain in
  a vat ends with the question are you sure that
  you are not a brain in a vat?.

5
A quick antisceptical argument

• We can eliminate the problem of scepticism if we
  reject the sceptics strong concept of knowledge
  with certainty condition.
• If we accept that knowledge may be fallible, the
  problem of global scepticism is eliminated.
• Then, we have right to believe that our beliefs,
  both scientific and common, belong to knowledge
  and fulfil the condition of truth.

6
Beyond Gettiers problem

• There are counterexamples to the standard
  definition of knowledge as true justified belief
  (Gettiers cases). So we lack good knowledge
  definition.
• But, we can accept the standard definition of
  knowledge with some understanding of the
  situation. It seems obvious today that our
  concept of knowledge works as a prototype concept
  and we can not define it by necessary and
  sufficient conditions.

7
Goldmans theory of prototype concepts

• Concepts are represented in terms of properties
  that need not be strictly necessary but are
  frequently present in instances of the concept.
  These properties are weighted by their frequency
  or by their perceptual salience. A collection of
  such properties is called a prototype. Under the
  prototype view, an object is categorized as an
  instance of a concept if it is sufficiently
  similar to the prototype (Goldman 1993, 128).

8
Other kinds of human knowledge

• Besides common and scientific knowledge we have
  some small kinds of knowledge that are
  non-scientific and non-common esoteric religious
  knowledge, knowledge how possessed by craftsmen,
  writers, painters and musicians, astrology etc.
• Let us start with scientific knowledge.

9
2. Science

• Science is a part of our culture (like religion,
  art, literature, architecture, law or
  technology). It is the set of institutions doing
  the systematic investigation of nature and
  society.
• It is usually said that the core of science is a
  method of investigating that discovers reliable
  knowledge. We can also say, like Popper, that
  science is not the method but a system of
  knowledge (concepts, problems and theories).

10
Karl Popper (1902-1994)
11
Scientific knowledge

• Scientific knowledge seems to have some specific
  features
• new in the world (what is known to most people is
  common)
• systematic gained by using established methods
• rationally justified on a base of empirical data
  and in a system of other accepted knowledge
• expressed in inter-subjective and precise
  language
• self-improving (critical and fallible).

12
Scientific method as a key to describing
scientific knowledge according to Goldman

• The most distinctive feature of empirical
  science is its requirement that beliefs be
  founded on precise measurement and careful test.
• Critical feature of science is invention,
  calibration, and utilization of ever more
  powerful and accurate instruments of
  observation.
• Science has at its disposal a systematic and
  sophisticated set of inferential principles for
  drawing conclusions about hypotheses from
  observations (Goldman 1999, 250, 251).

13
Some examples

• Medical science uses instrumentation to observe
  cells so far not perceivable. Physics uses
  accelerators to perceive small particles.
• Social scientist usually observes experimental
  groups and control groups to make licensed
  inference that certain dependent variable
  causally depends on a certain independent
  variable.

14
Scientific method?

• It seems that scientific method consists of
  special language and justification. The language
  is more exact than everyday language and the way
  of belief justification is more sophisticated and
  reliable than common beliefs.
• But, it is difficult to articulate the general
  features of scientific reasoning, because
  traditional confirmation theory has many rivals
  like Poppers hypothetical-deductive method.
• Let us look at common knowledge.

15
3. Common knowledge

• Common knowledge (everyday, pre-scientific)
  contains all information we encounter in our
  everyday life and reasonably accept as our
  beliefs.
• It probably (if the condition of truth is
  fulfilled) encloses most our everyday beliefs
  about the world, popular religious, moral and
  esthetical beliefs, knowledge how to earn money
  or get food, knowledge how to communicate and
  make decisions etc.

16
Common knowledge - some features

• Our common knowledge is subjective, difficult to
  express in exact language it is an accidental
  composition of different takings from different
  points of view.
• We accept common beliefs usually in a hurry, not
  enough carefully, usually on emotional reasons.
  That is why the common beliefs are not
  systematic, have gaps and even contradictions
  (see Kaminski 1981, 24).

17
Common knowledge is first knowledge

• Common knowledge is fundamental for our life
  because it is our first and basic knowledge. We
  can say metaphorically that science emerges as a
  beautiful coral-reef out of the big ocean of
  common knowledge. They belong to the same nature
  but the big ocean is the ground for the reef.

18
Common knowledge is practical

• Scientists after leaving their desks and
  laboratories must use common knowledge. They must
  communicate with colleges and family, eat
  breakfast, cross the street etc.
• Science is theoretical knowledge and even if it
  contains much information about balance food, it
  is not enough to make the decision what to have
  for breakfast today.
• Common knowledge with its flexibility and
  ambiguity is better to deal with everyday
  problems. We can say that common knowledge is
  practical one.

19
4. Difference and the demarcation problem

• The problem of demarcation between science and
  common sense is theoretical and practical.
• From the theoretical point of view it is
  difficult to find any absolute ground for the
  distinction. K. Pooper says that there is no
  specific scientific method, P. Feyerabend that in
  science anything goes, and L. Laudan that the
  demarcation problem is pseudo-problem.
• But in practice we can demarcate science quite
  well.

20
Popper about demarcation

• Popper criticizes traditional inductionism
  (accepted at Vienna Circle) and says that there
  is no unique methodology specific to science .
• He advocates falsibility as the criterion of
  demarcation for science. A theory is scientific
  only if it is refutable. That is why astrology is
  pseudo-science.
• But Poppers falsificationism is no better than
  inductionism, because every strange belief that
  can possibly be falsified must be called
  scientific.

21
Feyerabend about demarcation

• According to Feyerabend theoretical pluralism is
  the best for the development of human knowledge
  and for culture in general. It is a myth that
  science has priority to other kinds of knowledge.
  
• Facts are not enough to accept or refute a
  theory. Every theory is in conflict with some
  observations. Theories are accepted by decisions,
  tacit voting, discussions. Scientific discoveries
  are sometimes accidental and gained by irrational
  attitudes.

22
According to Feyerabend

• Copernicus has done only some improvements to
  ancient Filolaos theory, speculative and
  mystical.
• Galileo contributed to the development of
  mechanics by using technical skills of craftsmen
  and artists.
• Pre-scientific cultures were able to build
  pyramids.
• Demarcating science and non-science is artificial
  and harmful for the development. The best method
  is anything goes (Feyerabend 1975).

23
Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994)
24
Larry Laudan Demarcation is pseudo-problem

• The criterion of demarcation was to support the
  epistemic priority of science to non-science.
• Method, development, prediction or truth are not
  good ways to discriminate science. Probably all
  present theories are false, some are no
  developing and have no power to predict.
• There is no essential but only degree difference
  between science and non-science.
• So, if Laudan is right, our concept of scientific
  knowledge must stay unclear.

25
Larry Laudan, born 1941
26
No big divide

• Let us observe that the lack of demarcation
  confirms the lack of big divide. Scientific
  knowledge seems close to common sense.
• It does not confirm ontological divergence and
  the idea that only scientific knowledge is true
  or close to truth.
• Both scientific and common knowledge are
  approximations, both are results of human
  deperate efforts to understand nature.

27
Demarcation as a practical problem

• In practice scientific method is the best way to
  demarcate science.
• As we have already said scientific knowledge has
  more exact language and more reliable
  justification. It arises from sophisticated
  methods of observation and inferences (tested and
  corrected by many investigators, concerned with
  narrow phenomena that are easier to explain and
  predict). Science is specialized and systematic
  (theses are mutually connected and included to
  the theory).
• Laudan is right that it is the degree difference.

28
Demarcation in practice

• The scientific knowledge inherits the general
  condition of human knowledge. We have no good
  definition of scientific knowledge and we are not
  certain its existence (does present scientific
  beliefs fulfil the condition of truth?).
• We must agree with Feyerabend that absolute
  demarcation is hopeless. Our knowledge is
  fallible and our distinctions are fallible.
• But in practice we can demarcate scientific
  knowledge due to approximations, keeping
  tradition, using conventions, by decisions of
  scientific institutions etc.

29
5. Interdependence between common and scientific
knowledge

• Science seems continuation to common knowledge
  (making it more exact, clear and reliable,
  theoretical expanding, eliminating common
  ambiguities, too quick inferences etc).
• But many say that science is a jump to special
  thinking. Einstein is considered to say that
  scientist must refute common sense to discover
  something new. Especially great discoveries
  require rejecting usual way of looking and
  thinking. That is exactly the thesis of T. Kuhn
  about scientific revolutions.

30
Thomas Kuhn 1922-1996
31
Common knowledge is a source of scientific
knowledge

• There are many arguments that science is
  dependant on common knowledge
• Science has evolved from pre-scientific culture
  in ancient Greece.
• Every child first uses common knowledge and then
  some of children gradually learn science.
• All scientists are first of all people in society
  using common knowledge to survive.

32
Scientific method is connected with common sense

• We have said that the characteristic feature of
  science is sophisticated method and using special
  equipment.
• But, the main method of science is observation
  and reasoning, using senses and drawing
  conclusions. They are only strengthened by
  machines and cumulated knowledge.
• Even special thinking is immersed in common
  sense.

33
Scientific knowledge brings growth of common
knowledge

• The most precious part of the scientific
  knowledge of the XVI century (for instance the
  discovery that our planet Earth circulates around
  the Sun) today belongs to common knowledge.
• Education and media are ways to disseminate
  scientific knowledge and to introduce some
  scientific findings in popular form to common
  knowledge. It brings enrichment and development.

34
Value of scientific knowledge

• The representatives of scientism say that
  scientific knowledge is the most precious part of
  human culture and others, including common
  knowledge, are inferior. They say that science
  and only science can give answers to all
  answerable questions.
• But Foucault says that science is no better than
  other practices. What we call facts are just
  conventions established by a group. We know
  themselves that science can not answer many our
  questions.

35
Superiority of science

• Alvin Goldman defends superiority of science. It
  is not popular today to say that scientific
  theories are just true or even that their goal is
  achieving truth. We all know that they are not
  certain, that they are self-improving and develop
  as better and better approximations.
• But scientific practices are veritistically
  better than any set of non-scientific practice,
  science is better than non-science in generating
  accurate observable predictions on many topics
  (Goldman 1999, 247, 250).

36
Goldmans scientific realism

• Goldman proposes to re-express the Poppers idea
  of approximate truths or truthlikeness as
  different from truth. We can say that scientists
  believe not just F but F, to some
  approximation. If the approximation quantifier
  is suitably chosen, the believed propositional
  content can be actually true, not just
  approximately true (Goldman 1999, 246).

37
Scholars in society

• The status of scientific knowledge in culture is
  similar to the status of scholars in the whole
  society. Many people working in politics and
  business are cleverer and more practical. Many
  artists and writers are more popular. That is why
  they are better paid and admired.
• The reason is that our present science is
  important for future but not so important for
  today. Our present society uses the past scholars
  generations work. Present scholars prepare
  inventions for future society.

38
Conclusion dynamic interdependence

• First, scientific knowledge is dependent on
  common knowledge which is its source and support.
• Second, scientific knowledge is more effective
  and reliable and in this sense superior to common
  knowledge.
• Third, applied and popularized scientific
  knowledge is incorporated into common knowledge
  and brings its development.
• But, forth, common sense must control science to
  avoid averts effects like environmental
  degradation.

39
Literature

• Feyerabend Paul K. 1975 Science. The Myth and
  Its Role in Society Inquiry 18, 167-181.
• Goldman Alvin I. 1999 Knowledge in a Social World
  Clarendon Press Oxford.
• Goldman Alvin .I 1993 Philosophical Applications
  of Cognitive Science Westview Press, Boulder,
  Oxford.
• Kaminski Stanislaw 1981 Pojecie nauki i
  klasyfikacja nauk 3rd edition TN KUL Lublin.
• Laudan Larry 1983 The Demise of the Demarcation
  Problem Polish edition 1998 Zgon problemu
  demarkacji in Muszynski Z. ed. Z badan nad
  prawda, nauka i poznaniem seria RRR 31,
  Wydawnictwo UMCS Lublin.
• Sady Wojciech 2000 Spór o racjonalnosc naukowa
  od Poincarego do Laudana Monografie FNP, Wroclaw.
• Thornton Stephen 2006 Karl Popper in Stanford
  Encyclopedia of Philosophy http///entries/popper/
  .
• UNESCO WCS Declaration on Science and the Use of
  Scientific Knowledge, Budapest, Hungary 1 July
  1999 www.unesco.org/science/wcs/eng/declaration_e.
  htm (28.05.2007).