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Content of the presentation

• Safety objective in MFF
• Process adopted (SAM and ED78A)
• Main results
• Benefits and problems experienced

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• Safety Objective Overall Approach

Show evidence of Safety
Safety Analysis
Provide early feed-back to project
Provide reusable results
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Safety Objective Evidence of Safety

• In line with EATMP Safety Policy and ATM 2000
  Strategy
• Guarantee that the adoption of MFF procedures do
  not increase and, where possible, decrease the
  number of ATM induced accidents
• Reference figures for ATM induced accidents
  available only for most severe events

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Safety Objective Early Feedback

• Three releases of the Safety Case
• Three releases of the validation document with
  synthesis of the results
• Share of safety investigation phases with other
  project working areas
• Joint workshops with other project working areas

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Safety Objective Reusable results

• Adoption of Standard Methodologies
• Definition of templates
• Clear specification of the assumptions

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Process Adopted The references

• Safety Policy and Plan designed to satisfy the
  ESARR4 requirements
• Methodology mainly based on the application of
  the EUROCAE ED78A guidelines and on the Safety
  Assessment Methodology (SAM) of Eurocontrol
• Safety Assessment submitted to the Safety
  Regulation Commission

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Process Adopted Risk Based Approach
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Process Adopted Acceptability of Risk
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Process Adopted Scope of Safety Assessment in
MFF

• Identification of the Operational Scenarios for
  the application of the MFF procedures (OSED)
• Identification of potential hazards and of the
  severity of their consequences (OHA)
• Evaluation of acceptability (with reference to
  frequency), and safety requirements for
  limitation of non acceptable hazards or
  mitigation of their consequences (ASOR)
• Assessment of the achievement of the Safety
  Requirements (SSA)

MFF Scope
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Process Adopted OHA
Past Projects
OHA
Meetings with operational experts
Expert opinions
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Process Adopted Role of Operational Experience

• Mainly speculative work to be completed with
  empirical evidence
• Need for additional information concerning
  aspects such as detectability, mitigation
  ability, consequences, credibility, related
  hazards
• Use of the RTS to reproduce and study some
  potential hazards (specific traffic sample and
  cooperation of pseudopilots)

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Process Adopted ASOR - I
Hazards with associated consequences (from OHA)
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Process Adopted ASOR - II
Hazards requiring mitigation
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Process Adopted Role of Operational Experience

• Validation workshops with operational experts
  (controllers and pilots)
• Selection of experts who experienced potential
  problems when using the MFF procedures during
  simulation
• Hazards and safety requirements clustered and
  analysed using examples and visual support

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Process Adopted The results

• ASAS Spacing is a consolidated concept for which
  feasible safety requirements have been identified
• Main hazards associated with the use of a wrong
  target and delegation
• Crossing and passing not acceptable as part of
  the ASAS spacing application because of major
  difficult to afford safety problems
• ASAS Separation less consolidated and less
  validated concept for which only major safety
  requirements have been identified

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Benefits and problems - I

• State of the art approach incorporating SRC
  feedback and compliant with existing standard
  references
• Interactions between project working areas and
  between participants
• Deep and progressive involvement of operational
  experts (beneficial for both)

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Benefits and problems - II

• Lack of quantitative references for Safety
  Assessment (but for most severe events)
• Lack of statistic significance of the information
  elicited from operational experts
• Uncertainty in the quantification of basic events
  (especially human errors)
• Cost of the approach (justifiable in a context
  facilitating re-use)

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Questions
?
Alberto Pasquini Deep Blue alberto.pasquini_at_dblue.
it
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An Example - I
Wrong target in ASAS Spacing
Target 2 Delegated 2
Delegated 1
Target 1
8 Nm
8 Nm
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An Example - II

• Does the controller feel responsible for the
  separation even if the action of maintaining the
  distance has been delegated ?
• Does he assign correct priority to related
  actions ?
• Are the related tools offering adequate support
  for the activity ?
• Is ASAS interfering with the possible emergency
  manoeuvre ?