Fire and Explosion Hazard Management UK Offshore model

1
Fire and Explosion Hazard ManagementUK Offshore
model

• Presentation to the
• Dutch Seveso Inspectorate
• by
• Graham Dalzell
• (TBS)3

2
Risk Management Model ISO 18001
Policy
Planning
Review
Leadership Understanding Communication
Monitor
Implement
(TBS)3
3
Leadership Attitude

• Careful, courageous or reckless
• Investing or cost cutting
• Short term profit or long term stability and
  security
• Keeping going or prepared to stop
• No room for error
• Managing rules and compliance or managing
  hazards.
• Appeasing the regulator or matching their
  requirements to your own aims
• Understanding or ignorance
• Owning hazards and risks or employing
  consultants
• Reactive audit culture or proactive hazard
  management

4
Is it Safe?
Society demands the answer Yes Is this what the
managers of your major hazard sites ask?
5
We do risk assessments

• and we make recommendations,
• and we implement them,
• so the risk has gone away, hasnt it?
• Should we just deliver recommendations
• or
• Should we deliver risk and hazard knowledge

6
The Good News Culture

• LESSONS FROM LONGFORD
• The Esso Gas Plant Explosion
• Professor Andrew Hopkins
• Australian National University
• ISBN 1-86468-422-4

7
Hazard Understanding

• We will all know what is dangerous,
• why it is dangerous
• and what each of us must do to keep us all safe.

How can we manage if we dont understand?
(TBS)3
8
Most common comments during accident
investigations
No-one told me that could happen
I didnt know that was important
I didnt know it would be like that
9
So whats this and what caused it?
10
Who are WE?

• Everyone who manages a company, operation,
  design department or contract.
• Everyone who operates, maintains,
• inspects or audits a plant
• Everyone who designs a facility,
• process, assembly or component
• Everyone who supports design and operation.

(TBS)3
11
Director
Manager Supervisor Individual
Operations
Maintenance
Engineering Contracts Design
12
Communication We have a finite capacity for
information

• in our memory
• in an aide memoir
• accessible as a detailed reference

But do our risk analyses look like this?
13
Distilling the informationWho needs to know what
Senior management
Corporate risk levels patterns of risk by
business type and location future risks the
underlying risk drivers
Business and regional managers
Facility risk levels patterns of risk by
facility hazard and personnel demands on
business processes and others
Plant and project managers
Facility hazards, their relative risks
and characteristics hazard strategy
critical measures operating limits
Operators, technicians and designers
Hazard characteristics, why measures critical are
critical, performance standards and limitations
14
Assigning the responsibilitiesWho carries the
can and who says stop?
Senior management
Setting the tolerable risk levels and deciding
how close to operate providing the resources to
reduce risk
Business and regional managers
Operating within corporate risk levels providing
the supporting infrastructure Deciding how risks
should be managed
Plant and project managers
Operating the plant within its limits managing
the hazards and activities ensuring critical
measures are suitable
Operators, technicians and designers
Comply with procedures maintain their competence
and the plant to the performance standards
15
Developing the knowledge
Corporate Risk Level
Regional/business Risk profile
Regional/business Risk profile
Regional/business Risk profile
Facilities Analysis
Hazard Registers
Hazard Registers
Hazard Registers
Facilities Analysis
Facilities Analysis
Critical Measures
Critical Measures
Performance stds
Performance stds
16
Policy -
What do we want?
Policies must be structured and integrated Level
1 Leadership, accountability and tolerable risk
levels Level 2 Risk management, resourcing, and
relationships Level 3 Processes design,
operations, maintenance, contracts Level 4
Competencies, procedures, operating limits and
plant
(TBS)3
17
Typical Corporate HSE management system
Design and Construction
Leadership and Accountability
Community and Stakeholder Awareness
Operations and Maintenance
Risk Assessment And Management
Crisis and Emergency Management
Management Of Change
Incident Analysis and Prevention
People Behaviours and Competence
Information and Documentation
Working with Contractors and others
Assessment Assurance and Improvement
Customers and Products
18
HSEMS

• Default set of rules?
• Discrete and unrelated elements?
• Audit and compliance culture?
• Different owners?
• No coordination?
• Generic requirements rather than matching hazards
• No risk based investment and infrastructure?
• Importance based on perception not risk
• Cyclical emphasis on elements and hazards?

19
A SAFETY CASE IS NOTA HAZARD AND RISK
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

• But many companies
• think that it is

20
Typical Corporate HSE management system
Leadership and Accountability
People Behaviours and Competence
Operations and Maintenance
Design and Construction
Crisis and Emergency Management
Information and Documentation
Risk Assessment And Management
Incident Analysis and Prevention
Community and Stakeholder Awareness
Working with Contractors and others
Assessment Assurance and Improvement
Management of Change
Customers And Products
21
Bringing all the parts of hazard management
together
Inputs

• WHAT WE CAN EXPECT FROM THE COMPANY
• Minimum default standards for people and plant
• Actual condition and provision
• History and knowledge

Outputs

• WHAT THE RISK ASSESSMENT SHOULD DELIVER
• Hazard an risk knowledge
• Extra requirements above the default provision
• Critical plant, processes and procedures

What have we got, what do we need, what can we
provide, how do we live with it?
22
Planning-
What do we need to do?

• Understand the hazards
• Reduce risks at source
• Decide how, what and who we
• need to manage the hazards
• Set performance standards and operating limits
• Evaluate the risks
• Identify the improvements
• Determine the resources needed to implement
  hazard management

(TBS)3
23
HAZID
HAZARD UNDERSTANDING Cause Severity
Consequence Escalation
RISK
ELIMINATE
MINIMISE at SOURCE
STRATEGY
PREVENT
CONTROL
MITIGATE
EVACUATE
SYSTEM
PASSIVE
ACTIVE
OPERATIONS
EXTERNAL
STANDARDS
ROLE and SUCCESS RATE
IS IT GOOD ENOUGH?
NO - IMPROVE or CHANGE
YES PROCEED
COMMUNICATE
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ELIMINATE

• Inherently safer design and operation
• Designing out hazards simpler plant
• Eliminating or minimising causes
• Reducing the severity pressure, inventory, hole
  size)
• Reducing consequence fewer people, better
  layout, lower overpressures
• Design out people the make mistakes and they
  die.

25
STRATEGY

• What is the design case
• Is it practical to contain the effects?
• Rigorous source, consequence and escalation
  analysis effective control and mitigation
• Is it practical to make sure that extreme events
  do not occur
• Rigorous causation analysis and effective
  prevention

26
SYSTEMS

• Passive no moving parts highly reliable
• Active breaks down and requires maintenance and
  intervention predictable reliability
• Operational needs competent people and
  judgement subject to error
• External relying on others outside your control
  needs clear definition of expectations

27
Performance standards

• Active
• Functionality, Availability, Reliability,
  Survivability
• Passive
• Functionality, Inspection Frequency,
  Survivability
• Operational
• Numbers, Role, Competence , Availability
• External
• Duty, Availability, Resource

28
Risk Assessment
Is it good enough?

• How do we manage
• the judgement of adequacy?

29
UKOOA Risk based decision making framework
Extreme consequence uncertain hazards
Societal Values
Company Values
Well understood risk specific major
accident hazards
QRA
Qualitative Risk Assessment
Engineering Judgement
Well understood lower risk hazards
Good Practice
Codes and Standards
30
As Low as Reasonably Practical
31
Implementation-
Making it work

• Share the hazard and risk knowledge
• Establish the business processes
• Assign the responsibilities
• Provide the resources
• Embed or confirm the requirements
• - procedures, competencies, performance
  standards
• Implement the improvements

(TBS)3
32
The Reality Badly Maintained?
33
The Reality Badly Operated?
34
Monitoring-
Is it working?

• Advanced safety auditing (ASA)
• - Confirm hazard understanding
• - Is the process complete and is it
• working?
• Competence assurance
• Adequacy and compliance with procedures
• Plant integrity verification
• Adequacy of resources

(TBS)3
35
Review-
How and where do we improve?

• 4 levels of improvement
• Strategic corporate risk reduction
• - business rationalisation/closure
• Infrastructure and resource
• enhancement, facility improvement
• Hazard management improvement
• - strategy, system selection
• Performance improvement
• - people, plant, procedures

(TBS)3
36
Proactive Hazard Management not Retrospective
Risk Assessment
(TBS)3