Title: Recent Regional Trends in Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing and compliance with the internati
1Recent Regional Trends in MoneyLaundering and
Terrorism Financing and compliancewith the
international AML/CFT standards
- Cecilia Marian
- Manager, Technical Assistance and Training
- APG Secretariat
- August 2008
2Regional Challenges
- Generally characterized by great diversity in
size, cultures, economies, legal and
administrative systems, reliance on aid, low
institutional capacity, large cash economies,
high use of alternative remittance systems,
porous borders.
3Regional Challenges
- Serious terrorist activity and on-going threats
- Asia/Pacific region is a source destination for
terrorist funds - Corruption
- Proliferation of profit driven crime
- High use of alternative remittance systems
- Extensive use of cash and high value items
- Trans-national crime impacts across the region
- Major drug production centres in the region
- Relatively low institutional capacity
4Serious Terrorist Activity On-going Threats
- The region has experienced terrorist activity
over many decades the threats continue - Countries directly affected include for example
- Afghanistan Bangladesh
- Cambodia Canada
- India Indonesia
- Japan Malaysia
- Nepal Pakistan
- Philippines Sri Lanka
- Thailand USA
5Terrorism Financing
- Asia/Pacific region is a source and destination
for terrorist funds - Domestic terrorism funded nationally and
internationally - International terrorism, funded from within and
beyond the region - Sources of funds for terrorist financing within
and outside the Asia/Pacific region - High use of informal channels for terrorist
financing - Terrorists identifying risks and weak links in
CFT systems and exploiting them - Terrorist acts across the region threats
continue
6Corruption
- Corruption - political institutional impacts
- Systemic corruption undermines regulatory and
legislative AML/CFT regimes - Systemic corruption undermines institutional
development - Corruption is a key factor in both predicate
criminal activities and associated money
laundering - impedes effective implementation
- prioritisation, sequencing resource allocation
- may involve direct involvement in facilitating
ML TF - undermines trust in AML/CFT system
institutions - impedes effective domestic cooperation
- impedes international cooperation ability to
receive offer information, cooperation mutual
legal assistance
7Transnational Organised Crime
-
- Diverse range of organised crime groups and
criminal activities across the region. - Organised crime groups are laundering proceeds of
crime through the region. - Organised crime groups infiltrating legitimate
systems and entities. - Direct evidence of links between trans-national
organised crime and terrorism crimes? more
research needed.
8Drugs
- Major drug production centres in the region
- Heroin, opium, amphetamine type substances
(including precursor chemicals) and ecstasy - Increasing domestic drug consumption within Asia,
particularly heroin amphetamine type
stimulants. - Major drug distribution points and drug transport
hubs
9Other profit driven crime
- Significant levels of profit driven crime in
addition to the drug trade - People smuggling and human trafficking
- Arms trafficking
- Fraud
- Smuggling
10Trade Based Money Laundering
- TBML an important channel for criminal activity
increasingly important ML TF vulnerability - Use of TBML more attractive as other common ML
techniques are closed - APG collected almost 100 detailed cases on ARS,
including number of significant cases on TBML as
the settlement mechanism
11- High use of Cash and Alternative
- Remittance Systems
- Legitimate role for alternative remittance
systems (ARS) to remit monies to from
developing countries. High levels of migrant
workers. - May also reflect relatively low levels of access
to trust in regulated financial sector. - Cash economies and ARS are highly vulnerable to
exploitation for money laundering and terrorist
financing.
12- Cash Alternative Remittance
- Systems
- Use of informal channels (ARS, high value goods
and cash / gold smuggling) is a common ML TF
typology to remit money - often mingling
legitimate remittances and black monies. - ARS and cash couriering linked to other
trade-based TF ML typologies.
13Low Institutional Capacity
- Large number of developing countries in the
region. - High reliance on international aid including
from NGOs. May affect agenda-setting
priorities. - Diversity in the levels of institutional
AML/CFT development across the region affects
capacity and trust. - Weak links may be exploited.
14Risks of Doing Nothing
- Increased criminal and terrorist
- activity population at risk.
- Stability of the banking system
- reputation damage.
- Negative economic effects.
- Sanctions / threat of actions by the
international community. - Weak links attract money launderers and
terrorists. - National security issues.
15The Global Response..
-
- The international community has coordinated its
efforts in combating money laundering and
terrorist financing resulting in international
instruments, such as - The 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (the
Vienna Convention) - The 1999 UN Convention of the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism - The 2000 Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention) - The 2003 UN Convention Against Combating
Corruption - The 40 9 Recommendations of the Financial
Action Task Force - Establishment of the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) by the G7
16 Asia Pacific Regional Responses- APG
- The APG is the FATF-style regional body (FSRB)
for the Asia/Pacific region. - The APG does not set the standards against money
laundering and terrorist financing. - Those standards are global and are set by the
FATF.
17APGS Role
- APGs principal regional roles
- Implement the global AML/CFT standards
- Assess AML/CFT compliance
- Coordinate AML/CFT technical assistance
training - study methods and trends of money laundering
(typologies
18The FATF Recommendations
- Financial Action Task Force
- Established in 1990 by G-7 Summit in 1989 to
examine measures to combat money laundering - 33 members
- 40 recommendations
- International standard for AML - 40 anti-money
laundering recommendations developed in the 1990
and in 2003/2004 9 recommendations to address
terrorist financing were added - Revised in 1996
- Second round of comprehensive revision finalized
in June 2003
19The FATF Recommendations
- Comprehensive and consistent framework for
combating ML and FT - Minimum standards for measures to be
implemented by States consistent with
constitutional and domestic legal frameworks - Special focus - customer identification and due
diligence requirements, suspicious transactions
reports, use of trusts and corporate vehicles and
non-financial business and professions - Risk based approach
20The FATF Recommendations
- Legal Systems
- Criminalize laundering of proceeds of serious
crimes freezing / confiscation - Financial / non financial institutions measures
- Customer identification record-keeping
transaction reporting - regulation supervision
- Institutional Measures
- Financial intelligence units (FIU)
- Properly resourced government agencies
- International co-operation
- Mutual legal assistance extradition law
enforcement co-operation
21FIUs-Relevant FATF Recommendations
- R.26 Countries should establish a FIU that
serves as a national centre for the receiving
(and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and
dissemination of STR and other information
regarding potential money laundering or terrorist
financing
22FIUs-Relevant FATF Recommendations
- R. 25 Providing feedback on STR Reporting
- R. 30 Adequate resourcing -financial, human and
technical resources - R.31 Effective Domestic Cooperation Mechanisms
- R.32 Compiling of Statistics-to Facilitate the
assessment of effectiveness of measures - R.40 - International Cooperation- ability to
provide
23The Assessment of Financial Intelligence Units
- Key Powers receipt, analysis and dissemination
- Organization and structure-autonomy and
independence - Suspicious transaction reports
- Access to Information
- Confidentiality of information
- Feed-back, guidance and strategic analysis
- Internal coordination/domestic interagency
coordination - International cooperation
- Egmont membership
- Resources, capacity and expertise
- Compiling statistics
24The FATF Recommendations
- Rec 1 -criminalise money laundering on the basis
of Vienna and Palermo Conventions - Rec 2 - Men reas minimum knowing include
concept that knowledge may be inferred from
objective factual circumstances. Sanctions extend
to legal persons - Rec. 3 -Confiscation of proceeds of crime
measures to identify, trace and evaluate property
to be confiscated provisional measures i.e.
measures to freeze or seize property to prevent
dealing, transfer or disposal of property and
appropriate investigative measures -
25FATF 40 Recommendations
- Rec 4 - FIs Secrecy Laws to be overridden
- Rec 5 - Comprehensive CDD measures based on risk
analysis - Prohibition of anonymous accounts
- Rec 6 - Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)
- Rec 7 - cross-border correspondent banking
- Rec 8 - ML threats arising from new and
developing technologies (non-face to face
business relationship and transactions)
26FATF 40 Recommendations
- Rec 9 - performance of CDD process by third
parties/intermediaries and business introducers - Rec 10 - Keeping transaction and CDD records
- Rec 11 pay attention to complex, unusual large
transactions and usual patterns of transactions - Rec 13 - reporting of suspicious transactions
(STRs) - Rec 16 - the application to designated
non-financial businesses and professions - Rec 17 - the existence of effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sanctions (criminal,
civil or administrative)
27The FATF Recommendations
- Rec 18 prohibition of shell banks
- Rec 21 - businesses relationships and
transactions with persons from countries which do
not or insufficiently apply the FATF
Recommendations - Rec 22 - application of principles to branches
and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad - Rec 23/24 - ensuring that designated institutions
are subject to adequate regulations and
supervision - Rec 25 - guidelines and feedback to be issued by
competent authorities
28The FATF Recommendations
- Rec. 26 - Establishment of FIUs
- Rec. 27 - designated law enforcement agencies
and use of special investigative techniques
encouraged - Rec. 28 - ability to obtain documents and info
for use in investigations and prosecutions
including records held by financial institutions - Recs. 29/30/31/32 - Requirements for competent
authorities - Recs. 33/34 - Transparency of Legal
persons/arrangements - Recs. 35- 40 - International Cooperation
29FATF 9 Special Recommendations
SR I - Ratify/implement UN Instruments SR II -
Criminalize terrorist financing and money
laundering SR III -Freeze/confiscate terrorist
assets SR IV- Report suspicious transactions
related to terrorism SR V- International
co-operation SR VI - Alternative remittance SR
VII - Wire transfers SR VIII- Non-profit
organizations SRIX Cross border declaration of
cash and negotiable bearer instruments Cash
couriers
30Other Functions of FIUs in AML/CFT Framework
- Very often, Agency leading AML/CFT efforts
- Supervisory agency for DNFBPs
- Central, Key Agency to Interagency domestic
cooperation - Interface between preventative sector, regulatory
agencies and the law enforcement agencies
31What Works
- National Coordination Committee
- Financial Sector/Private Sector Consultation
- Law Enforcement and Regulatory Consultation
- International Regional Cooperation and
Collaboration
32What Works
- Establish an understanding of the global AML/CFT
standards and assessment processes - Develop and implement national strategies
- Develop an implementation plan
- Engage in political awareness- raising
Gathering Political support - Request TA T where needed
33Summary Conclusions
- The pressures to comply with the global AML/CFT
standards are very real and mounting. - There are some significant challenges in the
region. - Crime and terrorism are cross-border threats
requiring national, regional and global
responses. - The risks of not responding are clear.
- FIUs are central to effective AML/CFT systems
that address regional challenges international
obligations. - There is much to be done and some real
opportunities for cooperation and collaboration.
34- QUESTIONS???
- www.apgml.org
- mail_at_apgml.org