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Sankha Subhra Dey SSD

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How do we define authentication? Identifying an object ... Request Spoofing. INVITE. BYE. CANCEL. 6. SIP Digest Authentication ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Sankha Subhra Dey SSD


1
SIP Authentication
  • Sankha Subhra Dey (SSD)?
  • Computer Science,
  • Columbia University
  • VoIP Security
  • Prof. Henning Schulzrinne
  • November 5, 2008

2
Discussion Topics
  • Overviews
  • SIP
  • Authentication
  • Authentication mechanisms
  • TLS Overview
  • HTTP digest, S/MIME
  • Issues with SIP authentication mechanisms

3
SIP Overview
  • SIP is an application layer protocol
  • Text-based
  • Based on a request-response model
  • End users negotiate stream details using SDP
  • All clients register with a registrar server for
    a domain
  • Main Functions
  • Invite users to sessions
  • Find the users current location, match with
    their capabilities and preferencesin order to
    deliver invitation
  • Carry opaque session descriptions
  • Modification of sessions
  • Termination of sessions

4
SIP Authentication
  • How do we define authentication?
  • Identifying an object
  • Knowing that the identity of an object is same as
    what the object claims
  • Used to identify the following cases
  • REGISTER
  • INVITE
  • Re-INVITE
  • BYE
  • Mechanisms
  • HTTP digest authentication (RFC 3261)?
  • Basic authentication (deprecated, will not be
    discussed)?
  • Transport layer mechanism
  • Using S/MIME for authentication

5
Some possible attacks in the absence of SIP
authentication
  • Replay Attacks
  • Simple
  • Replay a timestamped message (can be detected)?
  • Replay a message that did not reach destination
    (cannot be detected)?
  • Registration Hijacking
  • Request Spoofing
  • INVITE
  • BYE
  • CANCEL

6
SIP Digest Authentication
  • Both ends use the same shared secret key.
  • The key is used to encrypt certain information
    such as the users password.
  • Originated from HTTP, and is often called HTTP
    digest.
  • RFC 3261 describes how digest authentication is
    applied to SIP.

7
Digest Authentication Mechanism
  • Server receives INVITE request
  • Server sends a PAR response containing a realm,
    algorithm and a nonce value (among other fields)?
  • Realm is the associated domain
  • Nonce is a random number (prevents replay)?
  • Algorithm to be used for digest calculation (say,
    MD5)?
  • Client computes a response using the nonce and
    the username and a secret password
  • The password is assumed to be stored by the
    server as well
  • Client sends back original request with computed
    response

8
Digest Authentication Mechanism (contd.)?
  • Other important header components and motivation
    behind them
  • Nonce could be a digest of client IP address and
    a time-stamp
  • Prevents replay attacks (attacker must use
    correct IP address before the time stamp
    expires)?
  • Cnonce (optional) generated, stored and sent to
    the server by client
  • Client can vary the input to this hash rather
    than let the server choose it
  • Server must include it in response
  • Nonce-count server maintains its own copy of
    this count
  • Protects against replay attacks
  • Qop (optional) Quality of protection (auth
    authentication, auth-int authentication and
    integrity)?
  • Username and password unique information known
    only by the client and the server

9
Digest Authentication Calculation
  • Request-digest ltgt ltKD (H (A1), unq
    (nonce-value)?
  • nc-value
  • unq (cnonce-value)?
  • unq (qop-value)?
  • H (A2)?
  • ) ltgt
  • where
  • A1 unq (username-value) unq (realm-value)
    passwd
  • A2 Method digest-uri-value
  • KD (secret, data) string obtained by applying
    the digest algorithm on data with secret
  • H (data) string obtained by applying the
    checksum algorithm to the data
  • unq (X) value of quoted string X, without the
    surrounding quotes

10
SIP REGISTER with DIGEST Authentication
Proxy Server
User Agent
REGISTER ltltAoRgtgt (with out credentials)?
407 Proxy Authentication Required
REGISTER ltltAoRgtgt (password encrypted with key)?
200 OK
11
SIP INVITE with DIGEST Authentication
UA
UA
Proxy Server
INVITE ltltuser1_at_domain1gtgt (without credentials)?
407 Proxy Authentication Required
ACK
INVITE ltltuser1_at_domain1gtgt (with encrypted
password)?
100 Trying
INVITE ltltuser1_at_domain1gtgt (password removed)?
12
TLS Overview
  • Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a version of
    Secure Sockets Layer
  • TLS/SSL is the basis for web security
  • HTTPS HTTP over TLS/SSL
  • Functions
  • Server to client (optionally, vice versa)
    authentication using public keys
  • Negotiation of shared private session key
  • Encryption of all messages once the connection
    has been established

13
Secure SIP using sips
  • SIPS is a low cost means of encryption.
  • It specifies TLS (transport layer security) over
    TCP
  • Not subject to tear down attacks
  • Same technology used for SSL. A SIPS call will
    fail rather than complete insecurely.
  • Example - ltsips alice_at_atlanta.comgt

14
Using S/MIME for authentication
  • Carry replicates of SIP header fields inside a
    MIME body.
  • Enables authentication by signing the replicated
    header fields
  • Helps to verify the identity of the sender
  • RFC 3261
  • Replication of all header fields inside a MIME
    part.
  • Problems with this proposal
  • SIP header fields might get altered by
    intermediate SIP entities.

15
Using S/MIME
  • Problems with RFC 3261 S/MIME proposal (contd.)?
  • Makes it difficult for recipients to identify the
    legal or malicious changes.
  • SIP messages can be large in size,
  • causes overhead for processing and transporting
    of messages
  • Solution RFC 3893
  • Proposed to overcome these problems (discussed in
    my previous presentation on SIP Identity)?

16
Issues with authentication mechanisms
  • Digest authentication
  • Lack of securing all headers and parameters
  • Only protects Request URI and method fields
  • Requires preexisting user configurations on
    server
  • SIP over TLS
  • Only allows hop-by-hop authentication
  • S/MIME
  • Public keys difficult to distribute and maintain

17
Summary
  • Overview of SIP and Authentication
  • HTTP digest authentication
  • Overview of TLS
  • Secure SIP using sips
  • Using S/MIME for authentication
  • Issues with SIP authentication mechanisms

18
Information Sources
  • RFC 3261(2002)?
  • RFC 2671 (1999)?
  • Jonathan Rosenberg, Dynamicsoft, at VoN
    Developer's? Conference, 2001 (www.jdrosen.net/pap
    ers/devconfw2001_proxies.ppt)?
  • Stephen Kingham, SIP workshop, Tokyo, 2005
    (www.apan.net/meetings/tokyo2006/presentation/sip-
    DNS-Authentication-Peering-SRK1.ppt)?
  • Qi Qiu,Study of Digest Authentication for SIP
    (www.site.uottawa.ca/bob/gradstudents/DigestAuthe
    nticationReport.pdf)?
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