The Politics of Transition in Central and Eastern Europe Lecture 6: The Dynamics of ConflictPreventi

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The Politics of Transition in Central and
Eastern EuropeLecture 6 The Dynamics of
Conflict-Prevention

• Dr Gwendolyn Sasse
• Gwendolyn.Sasse_at_nuffield.ox.ac.uk

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Autonomy

• individual/personal vs. territorial autonomy (K.
  Renner, 1918) state as a sum of individuals and
  a federation as a sum of nations irrespective of
  a territorial dimension (Personalverband instead
  of Territorialverband).
• territorial political autonomy is an arrangement
  aimed at granting to a group that differs from
  the majority of the population in the state, but
  that constitutes the majority in a specific
  region, a means by which it can express its
  distinct identity (R. Lapidoth, 1996)
• the degree of actual as well as formal
  independence enjoyed by an autonomous entity in
  its political decision making process. (Hannum
  and Lillich, 1981).

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Symmetrical vs. Asymmetrical Federalism (Charles
Tarlton, 1965)

• Symmetrical federalism
• an ideal symmetrical federal system would be
  one composed of political units comprised of
  equal territory and population, similar economic
  features, climatic conditions, cultural patterns,
  social groupings, and political institutions
• Asymmetrical federalism
• an ideal asymmetrical federal system would be
  one composed of political units corresponding to
  differences of interest, character, and makeup
  that exist within the whole society
• gtgt Asymmetry is inherently unstable!

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Questions after reading Tarlton

• What federations fit Tarltons definition of
  symmetry? (i.e. good definition of ideal-types
  or tendencies rather than actual
  political/economic/societal reality in any
  federation)
• Asymmetric federalism might bear conflict
  potential, but can it be a viable/the only
  approach to conflict-management? If so, under
  what conditions?
• Is it asymmetry itself that is the problem, or is
  it the principle of federalism/autonomy under
  certain conditions?
• What can be done if asymmetry is the legacy (i.e.
  the starting-point) that has to be accommodated?
• Does asymmetric federalism bring about
  ethnification of politics?

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Composition of Russian Federation

• RSFSR in 1989 census 81.5 Russians (50.78 in
  the USSR) compare RF in 2002 79.83 Russians
  3.83 Tatars 2.03 Ukrainians
• hierarchical system of territories (krai),
  Autonomous Republics (ASSRs), Autonomous Regions
  (oblasti) and Autonomous Districts (okrugi)
• 31 units with ethnic designation (16 ASSRs, 5
  Autonomous Regions and 10 Autonomous Districts)
• only 4 ethnically designated units (ASSRs) with
  an absolute majority of the titular group
  North-Ossetia, Tuva, Checheno-Ingushetia,
  Chuvashia
• 3 ASSRs with a simple majority of the titular
  group Tatarstan, Kabardino-Balkar, Kalmykia
• Federal Treaty (1992) 20 ethnic republics (16
  ASSRs 4 upgraded autonomous regions Adygeia,
  Altai, Karachai-Cherkessiya, Khakassiya)

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Constraints on Secession Potential

• Internal constraints
• Demographic composition high level and spread of
  Russian ethnic homogeneity across federal units
  largest minority group Tatars less than 50
  in 1991
• Resource interdependencies only 4 ethnic
  republics economically significant Tatarstan
  (oil/manufacturing), Bashkortostan (oil/transit),
  Sakha-Yakutia (diamonds), Chechnya (refining
  capacity, strategic location for pipelines)
• Location Chechnyas peripheral/border location
  underpins secession potential, but not location
  close to the core of the federation surrounded by
  loyalist units (Tatarstan Bashkortostan
  landlocked by ethnic Russian regions, Sakha
  (Yakutia) effectively landlocked in Siberia)
• Historical assimilation even in Tatarstan
  Chechnya experience of independent statehood is
  not a recent one only region with independent
  status in the 1920-40s (Tuva) has no secessionist
  movement
• External constraint
• Non-recognition of secession (e.g.
  Tatarstan/Chechnya)

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(Re-)Designing Russian Federalism

• Phase 1 1990 March 1992
• 1990/91 parliamentary Constitutional Commission
  suggested replacing asymmetric system with
  symmetric system consisting of about 50 new units
• March 1992 Federal Treaty (confirmed asymmetry
  Tatarstan and Chechnya refuse to sign it)
• Phase 2 March 1992 - December 1993
• elite conflicts and negotiations/inter-regional
  associations
• December 1993 Constitution (equalisation of
  status and principle of bilateral treaties BUT
  precedence of the constitution over the Federal
  Treaty only established in 1998)
• Phase 3 Phase 3 December 1993 June 1999
• February 1994 bilateral power-sharing treaty
  with Tatarstan, followed by Bashkortostan and
  Sakha and other republics
• January 1996 first bilateral treaties signed
  with regions (Kaliningrad, Sverdlovsk, Orenburg,
  Krasnodar)
• by summer 1998 46 subjects have signed federal
  treaties

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Gradual Re-Centralisation

• Phase 4 June 1999 -
• June 1999 parliament passes federal law
  according to which all treaties have to be
  revised to comply with the Russian constitution
  by 2002
• since early 2000 modification of treaties
• May 2000 Putin embarks on territorial
  restructuring/ recentralisation (7 super-regions
  headed by appointed governors)
• June 2000 Constitutional Court ruling initiates
  judicial review process which aims to ensure that
  the constitutions of the subjects of the
  federation comply with the Russian constitution
• August 2000 federal law changes structure of
  Federation Council (governors replaced with
  representatives approved by governors)
• Creation of new consultative State Council
  (president, regional and republican leaders meet
  four times a year)

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Conflict-Potential in Tatarstan

• Political and economic conflict potential rather
  than ethnic (in all 4 economically significant
  ethnic republics, incl. Chechnya in the early
  period)
• gtgt claims to sovereignty and tax war with
  Moscow forces Yeltsin into negotiations
• Over time nationalising policies strengthen
  ethnic identification of Tatarstan, but managed
  by strong rule of Tatarstans president Chechnya
  as lesson for centre regions highly
  personalised centre-regional relations
  constitutional ambiguity limit conflict
  potential, but also enable gradual strengthening
  of centres control)

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Asymmetric federalism in Russia

• RSFSR is the one socialist federation that
  survived
• Legacy of asymmetric federalism as starting-point
  in Russian Federation i.e. only option
  re-federalisation ( continued asymmetry, as move
  towards symmetry would have entailed greater
  conflict potential)
• Asymmetric federalism as counterweight to
  hegemonic control/russification
• and as a means of conflict-prevention and
  political stability in transition period

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contd.

• BUT
• exception to the rule Chechnya!!
• Asymmetric federalism did not guarantee
  democratic regime change (authoritarian rulers at
  regional and national level)
• Asymmetric federalism did not foster coherent
  economic transition/control of resources/tax
  collection
• Stabilising effect only during a certain time
  period (early on in transition)
• BUT
• Problems mostly tied to the practice of Russias
  asymmetric federalism, i.e. the non-transparent
  nature of power-sharing based on bilateral
  treaties.

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Ukraine post-1991

• Ukrainian state of 1991 a historical novelty
• Habsburg, Russian, Ottoman Soviet empires left
  mark on Ukraine gtgt reflected in Ukraines
  regional diversity
• Regional diversity (ethnic, linguistic,
  religious, socio-economic, historical memories,
  different political/foreign policy orientations)
  as key characteristic shaping every aspect of
  transition (Ukraine as state of regions)
• BUT
• - depiction of ethno-linguistic east-west split
  of Ukraine too simplistic
• - ethnic conflict potential limited (e.g. small
  cultural distance between Ukrainians and
  Russians)
• - demands for autonomy (e.g. Transcarpathia,
  Donbas, Crimea)
• - Crimea most important territorial challenge
  in Ukraine
• International dimension struggle for attention
  in the West vs. dependence on Russia (also the
  making of Ukraine is tied to the unmaking of
  Russia, see Szporluk)

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Conflict-Potential in Crimea

• gtgtIn July 1993 The Economist warned of a
  long-running, acrimonious, possibly bloody and
  conceivably nuclear, dispute over Crimea.
• Risk factors
• range of historical/cultural associations
  with/claims to the territory
• ethnic make-up only region with Russian
  majority, (russified) Ukrainians, Crimean Tatars
  et al. (2001 census 58.3 Russians, 24.3
  Ukrainians, 12 Crimean Tatars 1989 census 67
  Russians, 25.8 Ukrainians, 1.6 Crimean Tatars)
• experience of deportation (Crimean Tatars)
  return movement
• geographical location (peninsula)
• 'Soviet' orientation (demography, socio-economic
  structures, 'Soviet' identity)
• foreign policy issues Russian-Ukrainian
  relations (Crimea's status, 1954 transfer to Ukr.
  SSR, division of Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol),
  Turkey as regional actor
• memory of previous Crimean autonomy (post-1917)

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Types of Potential Conflict in Crimea

• Intra-regional conflict between different
  ethnopolitical groups
• Centre-periphery conflict (Kyiv vs. Simferopol)
• Conflict between Russia and Ukraine
• Conflict centred on Crimean Tatar issues

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Why no conflict in Crimea?

• Four background conditions
• multi-ethnicity prevented clear-cut
  ethnopolitical polarisation
• latecomer in political mobilisation brittle
  nature of Russian ethnopolitical mobilisation
  (failed to address cross-cutting socio-economic
  concerns)
• pragmatic approach by central elites in Kyiv
  (e.g. regarding language law)
• lack of an active external prop for nationalism
  in Crimea
• Key factor of conflict-prevention
• protracted constitution-making process
  (1991-1996/8) at both the national and
  sub-national level (starting with creation of
  Soviet autonomy in 1991!)

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Summary on Ukraine/Crimea

• - Ukrainian constitution tension between
  principle of unitary state (Article 1) and
  existence of Autonomous Republic of Crimea
  (Article 10)
• Russian nationalism not always the key conflict
  potential, esp. in presence of cross-cutting
  cleavages (esp. economic)
• some legacies are conflict-prone, others can
  foster accommodation acknowledge
  multi-ethnicity
• foreign actors proved less willing to provoke
  (incl. Chechnya lesson) international
  institutions can help to stabilise if talks are
  about institutions (e.g. OSCE High Commissioner)
  or practical issues (e.g. UNDP)
• institutions play important role in
  conflict-prevention, less as institutional
  design or outcome (final autonomy status
  weak) but process of institution making (Sasse)
• Crimea question contributed to civic
  state-building in Ukraine
• Process of autonomy-making proved politically
  stabilising, but economic crisis got worse
• Different types of conflict were prevented, but
  Crimean Tatar issues still unresolved!
• BUT causal dilemma impossible to solve has
  autonomy prevented conflict was autonomy
  possible because of prevention of conflict?

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Summing up

• Autonomy federalism (incl. asymmetric
  federalism) can contribute to conflict-prevention
  (e.g. Tatarstan/Crimea) - without necessarily
  promoting democratisation or economic reform.
• Autonomy federalism (incl. asymmetric
  arrangements) in post-conflict or ongoing
  conflict situations at best secure the peace, but
  might reinforce rather than resolve the tensions.

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International Institutions Conflict-Prevention
in CEE

• three main institutions in Europe CoE, OSCE, EU
• gt inter-institutional cooperation? overlapping
  mandates? rivalry?
• CoE strongest in early transition period key
  player post-EU accession? scope beyond EU?
• OSCE key role in defining standards in early
  1990s, weakened over time (partly as result of EU
  accession process)
• EU provided OSCE and CoE with key backing
  during accession process so far, trickier in
  Western Balkans, very limited in ENP countries
• joint focus on citizenship/language/public
  administration laws and policies educational
  policies
• joint reluctance to promote autonomy or
  ethnopolitical parties (BUT one of OSCE
  recommendations in early 1990s included reference
  to autonomy as one means of accommodating
  minority interests both OSCE and CoE emphasis
  effective participation, EU did not follow up
  on this)
• joint securitisation of minority issues
  (Kymlicka distracts from value of minority
  protection)

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Minority Protection EU Conditionality I

• Starting-point
• First EU Copenhagen criterion stability of
  institutions guaranteeing democracy, rule of law,
  human rights and the protection of minorities
• why this new criterion? (democracy security
  concerns CoE OSCE)
• paradox prominent issue during accession vs.
  lack of EU competences
• Compliance problems
• lack of foundation in EU law and different
  approaches in Member States
• no internal EU policy priority
• no international consensus on national minority
  minority rights
• dilemma of enforcement and implementation

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Minority Protection EU Conditionality II

• Empirical issues
• international actors framed debates perceptions
  and affected timing nature of specific
  legislation constitutional provisions
• key domestic political context actors (EU as
  reinforcement mechanism/lock-in effect)
• BUT evidence that lock-in effect can also be
  unintended (e.g. deepening of structural
  problems, majority consensus)
• BUT evidence that EU indirectly encourages
  ethnic power-sharing as well as polarisation
• policy leverage of EU anchored in Council of
  Europe (FCNM)/ OSCE
• minority rights now part of EU speak (e.g.
  stronger link between human rights/fundamental
  rights minority rights)
• Conceptual issues
• questions mainstream notion of variable-like
  conditionality (rather political construct)
• questions effectiveness of conditionality by
  pointing to contradictory effects
• widens notion of Europeanization (interaction
  between international institutions)