Enhancements in Security, Performance Modeling and Optimization in Vehicular Networks - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Enhancements in Security, Performance Modeling and Optimization in Vehicular Networks

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Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) with vehicles as mobile nodes ... Authenticity genuine v/s malicious source. Anonymity sender having right to privacy ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Enhancements in Security, Performance Modeling and Optimization in Vehicular Networks


1
Enhancements in Security, Performance Modeling
and Optimization in Vehicular Networks
  • Ashwin Rao
  • 2006SIY7513
  • Supervisor Arzad A. Kherani

2
Introduction to VANETs
  • Mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) with vehicles as
    mobile nodes
  • Application classification
  • Safety Related - Early Warning Messages
  • Best Effort Traffic Optimization
  • Secure Transactions Toll collection
  • Application to enhance safety of passengers

3
VANET jargon
  • VANET Vehicular Ad hoc networks
  • OBU On Board Unit communication equipment in
    vehicles
  • RSU Road Side Unit - provides infrastructure
  • WAVE Wireless Access in Vehicular Environment
  • DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication

4
PKI A brief overview
  • Asymmetric Keys (Pu -gt Public key, Pr -gtPrivate
    Key)
  • M Pr(Pu(M)) M Pu(Pr(M)) -- where M is the
    message to be secured
  • Certificate contains the public key signature
    of CA
  • Certificate sent with signed message to verify
    the signature of message
  • Certificate shouldn't be revoked for message to
    be accepted

5
Security in VANETs
  • Security essential to the protect critical
    messages
  • Mechanism providing security need to address
  • Authenticity genuine v/s malicious source
  • Anonymity sender having right to privacy
  • Data Integrity messages received as-is
  • Low Overheads to retain usefulness of messages
  • Use of PKI based security proposed in IEEE 1609.2

6
1609 Protocol Stack
  • Data Flows and Resources
  • Secure Message formats and their processing
  • Network Transport Layer Services
  • Enhancement to the 802.11 MAC

7
Revocation of Certificates
  • Required to distinguish genuine and malicious
    nodes
  • When does the PKI revoke a certificate ?
  • It is compromised
  • It is used for malicious activity
  • Other reasons like terminating the V2V service
  • Problems
  • Revocation information to be propagated to all
    concerned

8
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs)
  • PKI propagates revocation information using CRLs
  • CRLs are signed by the CA
  • Problems with CRLs in VANETs
  • Communication with infrastructure at irregular
    intervals
  • Varying contact times with infrastructure
  • Number of CRLs limited to storage space in OBU
  • Time to search the certificate in CRLs
  • Operating time of malicious node avg. CRL
    update interval

9
Accept/Drop Mechanism (Security Layer)
10
Confidence In Security Infrastructure
  • What is the probability that a certificate is a
    good certificate if it is not available in the
    CRLs at OBU?
  • How recent are the CRLs in the OBU?
  • How recent is the certificate under
    consideration?
  • With how much confidence can you accept the
    signed message?
  • On what parameters is this confidence related to ?

11
Parameters affecting CoS
  • r the revocation rate
  • Var( T ) variance in inter-CRL update times
  • E T - Expected CRL update interval
  • If Var(T) 0 then

12
Freshness checks
  • Sender and receiver have equal access to PKI
  • Sender checks if one of its certificates is
    revoked
  • The CA modifies the freshness check field in the
    certificate if it is not revoked
  • Freshness check field is part of the certificate
  • For receiver of messages to confirm freshness
    checks
  • For non-malicious senders to validate the
    genuineness of their certificates

13
Freshness Checks
14
Algorithm to Accept/Drop Messages
15
Advantages of Freshness Checks
  • Time for verifying signed messages
  • Independent of number of CRLs and certificates in
    CRLs
  • OBUs need not store CRLs
  • Reduced storage requirement of OBU
  • Solves problem of CRL propagation
  • The validity of certificate dependent on the
    current value of CoS and not determined at time
    of issue.

16
Reduced Operating Time Of Malicious Nodes
Time at which a certificate was revoked
17
Impact of Freshness checks
Fraction of packets from non-compromised nodes
Fraction of packets from compromised nodes
18
FutureTasks
  • Relation between CoS and probability of messages
    from non-compromised nodes getting dropped
  • Impact of the overheads of security on
    performance of secure messages
  • Impact of periodic transmission on the
    performance of secure messages
  • Adapting rate of transmission V/S Adapting
    transmission range of messages

19
Conclusion
  • Minimize some of the security overheads of
    verifying the messages by providing a constant
    time algorithm to accept/drop messages
  • Robust security infrastructure equally important
    for effective security

20
  • QA

21
  • Extra Slides (BACKUP)

22
IEEE 1609 protocol stack
  • 1609.1 - Resource Manager
  • Data flows and Resources at all points
  • 1609.2 - Security Services
  • Secure message formats and processing based on
    PKI
  • 1609.3 Networking Services
  • Network and Transport layer services
  • 1609.4 Multi-channel operations
  • Enhancement to IEEE 802.11 MAC

23
Research Agenda
  • Implement essential features of 1609.x protocol
    stack
  • Incorporate vehicular traffic data traffic
    models
  • Simulate V2V messaging at each node.
  • Propose algorithm to accept and drop messages
  • Study the performance metrics across widely
    varying system parameters (with and without
    security) in V2V networks.

24
Accept/Drop Mechanism (at Security Layer)
  • Received message signed using a certificate
    present in CRLs at OBU
  • Drop the packet
  • Received message signed using a certificate
    absent from the CRLs at OBU
  • Is the certificate revoked by the PKI ?
  • Is the certificate compromised but not revoked at
    the PKI ?
  • Is the certificate a genuine non-compromised
    certificate?
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