PAR and Institutional reform processes in periods of transition Case study Afghanistan

1
PAR and Institutional reform processes in periods
of transition Case study Afghanistan
Seminar on Capacity Development, Bratislava

• Stephan Massing Abdul Bari, UNDP Afghanistan

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Capacity in the Afghan public sector

• Major systemic problems
• Fragmented government structure with overlapping
  functions
• Outdated, cumbersome work processes procedures
• Highly centralized state limited presence at
  subnational level
• Inadequate pay and grading structure -gt twin
  civil service
• Absence of merit-based recruitment patronage
  nepotism
• Aging civil service unbalanced gender relations
• Human resource problems
• Ineffective Human Resources Planning
• Unskilled untrained civil service low capacity
  in policy development, project implementation,
  service delivery
• Lack of work ethic, morale, motivation and
  integrity

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The ARTF and its role in systemic institutional
capacity development

• ARTF World Bank administered multi-donor trust
  fund two funding mechanisms recurrent
  investment window
• Set up of ARTF has not been linked to the
  development of the PAR programme -gt minor role
  for institutional reform process
• Projects funded under investment window have no
  clear focus CD initiatives have been designed
  and implemented at project level -gt limited role
  for programmatic CD
• But, critical role in
• Coordinating channelling donor funding to
  recurrent costs
• Ensuring functioning of the administration
  providing resources needed to deliver basic
  services -gt stability
• Strengthening GoAs public finance management
  system

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The Public Administration Reform Programme and
the IARCSC

• PAR comprises six components
• civil service legal framework
• personnel management
• institutional streamlining development
• policy management machinery of government
• administrative efficiency
• physical infrastructure improvement
• IARCSC structure
• CS Management Department HRDM, legal
  regulatory framework, determination of a new
  salary structure
• Appointments Appeals Board merit-based
  recruitment
• Administrative Reform Secretariat coordination
  of PAR

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The Public Administration Reform Programme and
the IARCSC

• Constraints for implementation of PAR
• PAR programme overambitious and too centralised
  given low capacity of IARCSC some components
  outside IARCSC
• No strategic plan for IARCSC -gt No sequencing,
  prioritization of PAR programme
• No structured approach to strengthening IARCSC
  capacity prior to implementing the PAR
• Lack of oversight by Cabinet poor communication
  and briefings -gt no political public support
  for PAR IARCSC
• Slow, insufficient, uncoordinated overlapping
  donor support

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Institutional Organisational CD Priority
Reform Restructuring

• Priority Reform Restructuring (PRR)
• Main element of PAR for admin reforms and
  restructuring of ministries or departments
• Allows staff performing critical functions to be
  placed on an elevated pay scale in exchange for
  reform and restructuring
• Conceived as tool for civil service reform but
  also as pragmatic measure to attract retain
  capacity in government
• PRR salary scales as an interim solution to
  existing compressed pay scale and unconstrained
  wage increases
• Recruitment for PRR position on merit

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Institutional Organisational CD Priority
Reform Restructuring

• Failures Lessons Learnt from PRR
• PRR shifted from narrow strategic approach (key
  functions) to comprehensive reform programme
  (whole government)
• Expansion resulted in loss of quality of the
  process concerns about fiscal sustainability
  ignored lack of capacity in ministries to
  introduce reforms in IARCSC to support PRR
• PRR primarily seen as means of increasing
  salaries rather than part of institutional reform
  process
• Little or no formal restructuring has taken place
  after PRR approval due to inadequate support at
  ministry level
• Significant delays in appointment process due to
  lack of capacity in IARCSC and ministries
• Reluctance of ministries to deal with surplus
  staff in the absence of a policy on retrenchment

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Short-term capacity injection and its
contribution to institutional CD

• Due to limited capacity in the civil service,
  great need to attract short-term capacity from
  outside the civil service
• Afghan Expatriate Prog. (AEP) Lateral Entry
  Prog. (LEP) are recruiting Afghan expertise not
  available in the public sector
• Preliminary findings lessons learnt
• AEP LEP contribute to institutional CD in so
  far as they regulate salaries and incentives by a
  common set of rules
• AEP advisors have acted as catalysts for change
  had significant impact on the reform agenda of
  their agencies
• Concerns about limited impact of expensive
  AEP/LEP advisors in dysfunctional ministries
  (chicken egg problem)
• Concerns about insufficient skills transfer
  sustainability of CD
• High salaries for AEP advisors has resulted in
  political resistance

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Short-term capacity injection and its
contribution to institutional CD

• Due to low existing capacity limited supply of
  expertise, GoA has heavily relied on
  international technical assistance
• Some TA channelled through a facility (TAFSU) but
  its performance considered poor (weak capacity of
  TAFSU)
• TA in general has come under growing criticism
• TA under pressure to deliver specific outputs at
  the expense of developing government capacity
  (capacity substitution)
• TA hired for technical skills not for ability to
  transfer skills
• TOR often poorly formulated and performance not
  tracked
• Bad management of TA by the GoA lack of
  counterparts, oversight and coordination
• Benefit of TA for institutional CD mixed (trade
  off between short- and long term CD)

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Capacity injection through staffing support PMUs
and institutional CD

• PMU as pragmatic solution as immediate
  development reconstruction activities had more
  urgent priority than CD
• As external units PMUs operate outside the
  structure of gov. and do not strengthen
  institutional capacity of ministries
• PMUs result in weak ownership, can generate
  resentment among staff can blur lines of
  accountability
• After project completion dissolved PMUs usually
  leave little capacity institutional memory
  behind

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Capacity injection through staffing support PMUs
and institutional CD

• Recommendations lessons learnt
• Build programme mgmt. functions rather than PMUs
• Elaborate phase-out plans and exit strategies for
  PMUs and link them with a CD plan (permanent
  transfer of skills)
• Make use of existing incentive framework to fill
  staff gaps instead of using project staff to fill
  senior line positions
• Focus project support on programme mgmt. rather
  than project mgmt. so that staff are engaged in a
  range of projects
• Train managers staff to operate in a matrix
  mgmt. structure