EBO MiniForum Thoughts from a Consumer and an Observer of Consumers

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EBO Mini-ForumThoughts from a Consumer and an
Observer of Consumers

• BG Tony Cucolo
• Director, Joint Center for Operational Analysis
  Lessons Learned
• Camp Victory, Iraq
• 31 JAN 05

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Background

• Clarification Im an effects based zealot
  based on personal experience
• Bosnia, DEC 95 NOV 96
• CJTF-180, Afghanistan, OCT 03 APR 04
• Observations and findings from current operations
  at the joint/combined operational level, SEP 04 -
  present

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Key Take Aways

• Operators and executors shouldnt/cant wait any
  longerthe EBO train has left the stationweve
  been doing this a while now, and some folks get
  it, others dontand theres a plethora of
  opinions about what it is
• Current operations demand integrated planning and
  integrated executionthats Big J
  Jointmulti-service, multi-national,
  multi-agencyplanning together and executing
  together
• Effects based operational approach optimizes if
  not maximizes the inclusion, participation and
  understanding of this diverse population who must
  execute synchronized operations of great
  complexity
• Joint doctrine or at least a codified joint
  approach must be worked and published now

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Weve been at this a while

• Balkans, 1995-1996
• Military led execution of the Dayton Peace
  Accord, non-military execution lagged
• Meeting the basic needs of the local population
  was critical to maintaining securityrequired a
  mix of military, non-military, NGO/PVO efforts
  mixed with heavy information operations
• Only credible authority to execute some
  coordinated effort was US Military HQs involved
• Commanders put it together as they met challenges
  
• CJTF-180, Afghanistan, 2003-2004
• Transition to Sovereignty saw shift from develop
  targets-strike-develop new targets-strike
  kinetic-focused operations to area and
  region-focused full-spectrum operations
• US forces led the effort to expand the presence
  and influence of the Afghan central government to
  key population centers and enemy-influenced areas
• Commanders had to (have to) synchronize and
  coordinate efforts to set the conditions for
  elections and the empowerment of a fledgling
  central government and ministries
• Coordinating all elements of power to this end in
  the CJTF brought effects based planning and
  execution to a greater and greater importance
• Iraq, 2004-2005
• GEN Caseys Campaign Plan execution is effects
  based
• The Combined Assessment and Synchronization
  Boardstill undergoing developmental changeis
  his critical tool to see himself, assess his
  campaign plan, and adapt to changing conditions

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Interagency and Multinational Findings History
Report findings that have interagency
issues
Global War On Terror
National Events
Iraqi Perspectives
Post Major Combat Operations Analysis
Major Combat Operations Quick Look
Major Combat Operations Report
Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices
Haiti
Kosovo
The majority of JCOA-LL products have identified
significant interagency and multinational
interoperability findings.
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JCOA-LL Interagency Lessons Crosswalk
Integrated Planning / Integrated Action
Integrated Command Control
Manning / Resourcing
Information Sharing
Intel Fusion
MCOPMCO GWOT Haiti Kosovo NSSE
MCO Major Combat Operations PMCO Post
Major Combat Operations GWOT Global War on
Terror NSSE National Special Security
Events
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EBO links diverse execution cultures

• Please dont use the word plan around meI so
  much prefer toumdevelop a strategy.
• State Department guy
• Iraq, January 2005

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Complex Operations are the norm

• And information management in complex operations
  is tough.

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THE FOG OF WAR AND INFORMATION PATHOLOGY
The Old Paradigm lack of information thus
uncertainty The New Paradigm a deluge
of unfiltered information thus a new kind of
uncertainty.
What is important / relevant?
?
002 101 120 340 999 89 23 72 28 91
90 90 90 8812 7872 001 10 18
103729842374y327y45732
The solution is to select that information which
informs decisions. What decisions should be
informed? Selection of the decisions is based
on the conditions we want to create.
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THE COGNITIVE HIERARCHY
Know why it happened
Synthesized Visualized
Understanding
The goal is to attain actionable information not
to provide situation updates
Know what happened
Judgment
Correlated, Fused Analyzed, Displayed
Knowledge
Cognition
Formatted, Organized Translated
Information
Iraq, 2005 The CASB / BUA is somewhere around
level 2
Processing
Raw Signals Statistics
Data

• Is data collection purpose driven?
• Does the information inform decision making?
• Do we know what we need to know to support our
  goals?

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INFORMATION PATHOLOGY A VIETNAM CASE STUDY

• CHARACTERISTICS OF
  C2 IN VIETNAM
• Rise in Complexity since WWII more MOSs with
  fewer people per specialty
• Rise in Specialization all tasks require
  expanding levels of cooperation. As the
• amount of specialization grows, the amount of
  information needed to to
• coordinate the performance of the specialists
  grows geometrically.
• Centralization the obverse of specialization
  the more specialized the members
• are, the less capable any of them is of
  separately making independent decisions.
• This generates a hi level decision threshold.
  Important decisions reserved at the
• highest levels require a large and continuous
  information flow.
• Organizational Instability was a hallmark of
  operations due to short tour length
• and high turn over.

Due to increasing complexity, units in 1963
required 20 times more information than units in
1945 IOT execute their missions. - Van Creveld
Factors that caused an inordinate increase in
the amount of info needed to make any
decision. Factors Present in Iraq Today?
Complexity Specialization Centralization Organizat
ional Instability
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INFORMATION PATHOLOGY A VIETNAM CASE STUDY

• THE RISE
  OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
• McNamara and Westmoreland / assoc with Harvard
  Business School / OSA / Whiz Kids
• The Systems Analysis Approach
• - Define the parameters of any given problem
  and its role as part of a larger problem
• - Make underlying assumptions explicit /
  design COAs based on those assumptions
• - Quantify anything and everything that is
  quantifiable
• Limitations
• - Lends itself better to technical problems
  rather than operational ones for the latter it
• works with simple operations rather than
  complex ones
• - Excludes the moral / human factors
• - Counting Understanding

• Methods used to quantify winning the allegiance
  of the people and building a nation
• Villages pacified as measured by the Hamlet
  Evaluation System (HES)
• Miles of roadway / waterway opened up for
  traffic
• Economic Activity measured in traded tons of
  rice
• Performance of friendly troops as determined by
  kill ratios
• Enemy Body Counts
• None of which explained why we were losing the war

Statistics are no substitute for an in
depth understanding of the environment
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IRAQI EQUATIONS
ISF Lead ISF Competence Security Perceived
Effective ISF
Protection of minority rights Ability to
provide security Legitimate Government
Strength of the Iraqi Govt and ISF
Effective ISF Legitimate Government Popular
Support
Popular Support Indifference or hostility to
Insurgency
Maximize
Minimize
National Capacity Regional Capacity Surge
Capacity Insurgent Capacity
Complexity of Attacks Frequency of Attacks
Insurgency Potency
Strength of the Insurgency
Foreign Ins Foreign Support () / Internal
Ins Degree of Iraqi Resistance
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Thoughts about your challenge

• EBO needs some marketing among our collective
  professional communities, Joint and Service
• Recommend a more basic approach to defining and
  describingless scientific-soundingrelate to
  execution of synchronization of lethal and
  non-lethal operations at every opportunity
• Needs a mass effort pushin our training venues
  and in interagency or collaborative training
  venues

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Thoughts on Your Immediate IssuesSimplification
and Relation to Execution (1)

• The way Ive broken it down
• Receive/understand Strategic Aim
• Develop/state Desired End State
• Further, develop/state Desired Effectsthe
  details of what the desired end state is
• Understand the battle space to know how to
  achieve the desired effectswho/what interacts
  with whom/what(helps focus where to apply
  power)
• State the desired effects as interim operational
  objectivesissue plan/order
• Assess/re-assess achievement of
  objectivesassess/re-assess changes in the battle
  spacestay true to desired effects, but adapt to
  changesissue next order

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Thoughts on Your Immediate IssuesSimplification
and Relation to Execution (2)

• The way Ive applied it
• Elements of the Campaign Plan
• Receive/understand Strategic Aim
• Develop/state Desired End State
• Further, develop/state Desired Effectsthe
  details of what the desired end state is
• Operational level systems analysisheavy on the
  Intelligence side updated regularly to account
  for changes
• Understand the battle space to know how to
  achieve the desired effectswho/what interacts
  with whom/what(helps focus where to apply
  power)
• The duty of the effects coordinating
  body/boardmust be senior led/senior
  participationan effective approach from JTF to
  Battalion level
• State the desired effects as interim operational
  objectivesissue plan/order
• Assess/re-assess achievement of
  objectivesassess/re-assess changes in the battle
  spacestay true to desired effects, but adapt to
  changesissue next order

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Adding to E-mail Comments

• Can we get it done with current organizations and
  processes?
• Yes and yes
• Some minor modification to both but both
  (example, approach to JTF staff structure and
  planning processes like the MDMP) should be
  retained but modified to accommodate execution of
  effects based operations
• How far down can EBO go?
• EBO is being executed at the battalion level
  nowsome times, for specific operations or at key
  times and locations, EBO is executed at company
  level
• Planning and execution is not dependent upon
  technologiesCIE and other tools help immensely,
  but a fundamental understanding of the concept of
  EBO from planning through execution is more
  important that a collaborative tool
• Get the components right and, just like the MDMP,
  elements of EBO can be applied independently
  outside the processjust like Mission Analysis
  and Course of Action Development are

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Closers

• Some JTFs have difficulty balancing lethal and
  non-lethal efforts and effects
• EBO takes nothing away from the lethal sidethe
  outcome of the Joint effects coordination board
  meeting includes Airmen and Artillerymen deciding
  ordnance type, shell and fuze combinationsas
  well as PSYOPs experts deciding what product will
  be most effective to accomplish the OBJ
• Bottom line, appropriately written,
  execution-focused EBO doctrine and/or tactics
  techniques and procedures will help JTF
  Commanders and staffs balance (or at least
  appropriately time) lethal and non-lethal
  operations

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Questions/Discussion