Trustworthy OnLine Signatures: the Nightingale Approach - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Trustworthy OnLine Signatures: the Nightingale Approach

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Trustworthy OnLine Signatures: the Nightingale Approach – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Trustworthy OnLine Signatures: the Nightingale Approach


1
Trustworthy On-Line Signatures the Nightingale
Approach
  • Burt Kaliski, RSA Laboratories

2
Outline
  • On-line signatures
  • Assumptions and solution objectives
  • Comparing seven solutions
  • Joint authentication with Nightingale
  • Conclusions

3
On-Line Signatures
  • Service generates digital signature on behalf of
    user
  • User key or enterprise key
  • Benefits
  • User mobility
  • Security for signature key
  • Policy auditing
  • Challenges
  • Potential server compromise is basis for
    repudiation

4
Assumptions
  • Password authentication
  • Tokens, biometrics could also be supported
  • Client software
  • e.g., Java applet
  • no persistent state
  • Secure channel to service
  • Protects password, message
  • e.g., SSL with server certificate
  • One or more servers

Software trust issue!
Certificate trust issue!
5
Solution Objectives
  • Convenient for user
  • Single password
  • Dual control
  • Single server cant request or generate signature
  • Based on cryptographic key splitting
  • Intrusion-resilient
  • Resists full compromise of any single server
  • Even with dictionary attack on (weak) passwords
  • ? Trustworthy

6
How Key Splitting Works RSA Example
  • Signature key is split between two servers
  • Server 1 (n,d1)
  • Server 2 (n,d2)
  • where d d1d2 is standard private exponent
  • Servers generate partial signatures
  • Server 1 ?1 Md1 mod n
  • Server 2 ?2 Md2 mod n
  • Ordinary signature obtained from partials
  • ? ?1 ? ?2 mod n
  • Proof ? Md1d2 mod n Md mod n
  • Neither server can sign alone

7
Comparing Solutions Overview
  • No key splitting
  • Single server
  • Separate auth. server
  • Key splitting
  • Single server
  • Separate auth. server
  • Two passwords
  • Derived passwords
  • Joint authentication

8
Model and Notation
Notation P password (or hash)M message (or
hash)? signature indexes (1,2) indicate shares,
partial signatures
9
No Key Splitting Single Server
Client
  • verify P
  • sign M

Server
10
No Key Splitting Separate Auth. Server
Auth. server
Client
  • verify P
  • issue assertion
  • verify assertion
  • sign M

OASIS SAML / DSS hybrid
Signature server
11
Key Splitting Single Server
Client
  • partially sign M using password (e.g., d1
    derived from P)
  • complete signature

Yaksha / SingleSignOn.net
Server
12
Key Splitting Separate Auth. Server
Auth. server
Client
  • verify P
  • partially sign M
  • complete signature

(Many variants of this and following protocols)
Signature server
13
Key Splitting Two Passwords
Server 1
Client
  • verify P1
  • partially sign M
  • complete signature
  • verify P2
  • partially sign M

Server 2
14
Key Splitting Derived Passwords
Server 1
Client
  • verify P1
  • partially sign M
  • derive passwords from P
  • complete signature
  • verify P2
  • partially sign M

Server 2
15
Key Splitting Joint Authentication
Server 1
Client
  • partially sign M
  • split P into P1, P2
  • complete signature
  • partially sign M

Server 2
16
Joint Authentication with Nightingale
  • Nightingale joint authentication protocol
  • Brainard-Juels-Kaliski-Szydlo (2002)
  • Password is split cryptographically between two
    servers
  • P1 P R P2 R, where R is random
  • Two servers can verify password together without
    seeing or storing it
  • ? Compromise of one server doesnt reveal
    password
  • Based on Shamir secret-sharing, zero-knowledge
    techniques

17
Registering a Password
Password P
18
Verifying a Password (1)
Password P
19
Verifying a Password (2)
20
Verifying a Password (3)
If P P, then A B! Otherwise, A and B are
different
21
Comparing Solutions Summary
22
Conclusions
  • On-line signatures have many benefits
  • Key-splitting essential for dual control, but
    authentication may still be single point of
    compromise
  • Highest assurance and convenience when both
    servers participate jointly in signature and
    authentication

23
More about Nightingale
  • Nightingale Web site
  • Short brochure
  • FAQ
  • Technical paper from USENIX Security 2003
  • Press coverage

http//developer.rsasecurity.com/labs/nightingale
24
Questions?
  • Burt KaliskiDirector, RSA Laboratoriesbkaliski_at_r
    sasecurity.com1 781 515 7073
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