LAND TENURE IN INDIA Implications for Natural Resource Management

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LAND TENURE IN INDIAImplications for Natural
Resource Management

• D Rajasekhar
• Professor and Head, Decentralisation and
  Development Unit, ISEC, Bangalore
• Presentation at Natural Resource Management and
  Institutions The Links between Property Rights,
  Collective Action and Natural Resource
  Management, Februray 7-11, 2005, ICRISAT,
  Patancheru, India

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INTRODUCTION

• Land tenure implies rights in relation to land.
• Two types of rights - ownership and cultivation.
• Include different types of claims that people
  have to land and specify what one can and cannot
  do, and what benefits one is entitled to.
• Determine long-term incentives to invest in,
  sustain and improve resources.
• This, in turn, determines the collective or
  individual action around management of land.
• Land tenure is shaped by the government policies
  in relation to land reforms and their impact.

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Land reforms in India

• Advocated to bring in equitable agrarian
  structure and improve land productivity, thereby
  to increase food production.
• Three components
• Abolition of intermediaries b/w government and
  cultivator
• Tenancy reforms
• Principle of land to the tiller create the
  class of owner-proprietors
• If not possible, tenancy was to be controlled and
  rendered fair
• Eradication of share-cropping, fair rents and
  secured tenure.
• Fixation of ceiling on the size of landholdings
  and redistribution of surplus land.

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Tenancy reforms

• The tenancy area declined from 23 in the early
  1950s to 8 in the 1990s.
• Some landless tenants obtained ownership rights
  but, inter-regional variations exist
• Greater impact on absentee landlords with little
  influence in village power structure.
• Resulted in evictions, resumption of land for
  personal cultivation, concealed tenancy, reverse
  tenancy, reduced lease period (where it was
  formal).
• Between 15-25 tenancies in the country are
  illegal 80 of leased land is held by small and
  marginal farmers.

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Tenancy reforms (contd)

• Landlords taking pro-active role (such as cost
  sharing, specification of crops, etc.) due to the
  fear of tenant occupancy.
• The share of landlord in input costs increased
  due to technological changes.
• Tenant cultivators production efficiency may have
  gone up as falling wage employment opportunities
  contributed to enhanced interest.
• Gujarat experience shows that banning tenancy
  will not lead to desired results.
• National Commission on Agriculture stated that
  given declining land-man ratio tenancy cannot be
  banned.

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Ceiling laws

• Skewed distribution of land ownership in 1950s
  8 of large farmers owned 53 of land and 28 of
  marginal farmers owned 6 of area.
• Inverse size-productivity relationship suggested
  economic gains to small peasants.
• First phase (1960-72) of ceiling laws were not
  radical. A delayed and diluted legislation
  failed to have desired impact. In fact, provided
  scope for adjustments and for emergence of
  benami holdings or paper partitionings.
• Micro studies revealed land transfers in favour
  of the wealthy (due to tenancy reforms) and a
  rise in the concentration of land ownership.

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Ceiling laws (contd)

• More radical reforms in 1972 yet, the
  performance was poor.
• Land declared surplus was less than the estimated
  surplus land
• Only 1.8 million ha (out of 3 million ha) of land
  was acquired.
• 50 of land to be distributed was involved in
  litigation
• Land distributed was only 1.5 of NSA.
• Ceiling laws resulted in a change in land
  acquisitive ethos of rich peasants.
• Rich peasants started to gradually withdraw from
  the land market and started to seek greener
  pastures in non-agricultural activities.
• Noticeable decline in the concentration of land
  ownership

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Consolidation of landholdings

• Attempt was made to consolidate holdings to
  reduce inefficiency in operation and cultivation.
• But, received least attention no legislation,
  only persuasion.
• Between 1974 and 2004, age of area consolidated
  to planned area ranged between 22 and 40.
• Ceiling laws resulted in a rapid rise in the age
  of marginal holdings as the objective of these
  laws was equity rather than farm efficiency.
• Higher rates of partitioning resulted in
  fragmented landholdings as the ownership of
  holdings with different quality is perceived to
  be risk preventing mechanism.
• Yet, a rapid growth of marginal holdings (from
  28 in 1950s to 61 in 1990s) was a concern to
  the policy makers as the current holding
  structure neither meets efficiency nor equity.

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Land surveys

• The last survey of land was undertaken during the
  colonial period (1920).
• The changes in the ownership (legal or illegal)
  that have taken place since then are enormous,
  and call for fresh survey.
• Yet, no survey is undertaken due to the complex
  and sheer size of the task.
• Implies that land records are in a bad shape, and
  any dispute would call for official intervention.
• GIS technology however makes this feasible.

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Computerisation of land records

• Recording (periodic updating) of land rights is
  recongnised as an essential pre-requisite.
• Computerisation of land records is undertaken in
  a phased manner, and the task is complete in 177
  districts.
• Contributed to reduction in time for farmers in
  obtaining the required legal document.
• Delays in funds transfer and development of
  appropriate software and inadequate training
  resulted in slow progress.
• Involved entering the land records as they are
  without making any attempt to make them accurate.
• In the absence of any land survey in recent
  years, the records tended to be inaccurate in
  several cases.

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The landed farmer in India typically is...

• A tenant
• Not having a formal contract
• Cannot bargain with the landlord
• Does not have incentive to participate in a
  programme such as watershed and share her immense
  knowledge on practices of soil conservation
• who has to combine wage labour with occassional
  migration
• And so on.
• A marginal farmer
• Owning tiny and unviable landholding
• Not sure of exact size of the landholding
• Cultivating infertile land distributed by the
  government
• Small and scattered landholding coming in the way
  of participation in land development programmes

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The landed farmer in India typically is...

• An encroacher
• not sure of whether s/he will cultivate the land
  tomorrow
• not having incentives to invest and sustain
  landed resources
• But, paying sums to people who matter to keep
  cultivation rights
• What is needed to facilitate collective action
  among small and marginal farmers?
• A case study

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Fight to evict an encroacher of tank land -
Bheemanatta

• This village is located in Kolar district in
  Karnataka and has 64 households
• Heterogeneous village with 44 households
  belonging to SC/ST, 45 to OBC and 11 to upper
  castes.
• SC and OBC households were organized by local
  NGO, and the main intervention was micro-finance
• Micro-finance only marginally stabilised
  household incomes (through reduced dependence on
  informal agencies and borrowing for short-term
  production)
• Micro-finance, however, did not result in
  significant poverty reduction.

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Bheemanatta (contd)

• The poor expressed the need to rehabilitate the
  tank on which many of them depended for their
  livelihood.
• The command area of the tank included lands of
  many households
• But, the tank was dysfunctional, and hence,
  needed rejuvenation.
• The NGO, with donor funds, started community
  based rehabilitation scheme since 1994.
• An important problem was encroachment of tank
  land by an upper caste and wealthy person,
  occupying political position in gram panchayat
• Invested heavily on borewell and coconut
  plantation hence, reluctant to vacate the land
  despite the pressure of peoples organisations.

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Case study (contd)

• Peoples organisations met the encroacher for
  negotiated settlement.
• The encroacher refused challenged them to go to
  officials.
• Peoples organisations met officials
• Obtaining original land documents was difficult.
• Getting the surveyor to the site was difficult
  both because of shortage of staff and political
  influence of the encroacher.
• After continuous follow-up, surveyor demarcated
  the land
• Getting the encroacher evicted required the use
  of police force.
• The encroacher managed to implicate key
  representatives of peoples organisations in
  false cases

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A few lessons

• Small and marginal farmers require solid backing
  of civil society organisations
• The people could get the encroacher evicted due
  to their long association with each other in
  micro-finance groups and trust and confidence on
  each other.
• The poor state of land records make it difficult
  for the people to believe that they can ever
  achieve success and leads to considerable
  hardship.
• Collective action was costly to these farmers as
  this involved in many visits to officials,
  indifferent to their problem
• Their interest to act collectively to
  rehabilitate the public good was sustained
  because of clarity on future benefits stream and
  wage employment that was possible.