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Security in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks VANETs

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Title: Security in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks VANETs


1
Security in Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs)
  • Jayanthi Rao
  • CSE 825 Course presentation
  • March 10, 2008

2
Acknowledgements
  • Presentation based on
  • Maxim Raya and Jean-Pierre Hubaux, The security
    of vehicular ad hoc networks, SASN 2005.
  • Bryan Parno and Adrian Perrig, Challenges in
    securing vehicular networks, SECON 2005.
  • Some slides courtesy above authors.

3
Presentation outline
  • What is a VANET?
  • VANET applications
  • Adversaries
  • Security threats and attacks
  • Security primitives for attack prevention or
    handling strategies

4
A modern vehicle
A modern vehicle is a network of
sensors/actuators on wheels !
5
What is a VANET (Vehicular Ad hoc NETwork)?
  • Communication typically over the Dedicated
    Short Range Communications (DSRC) (5.9 GHz)
  • Example of protocol IEEE 802.11p

6
Motivation for VANET
  • Increase safety
  • Hundreds of thousands of people are killed
    world-wide due to road accidents yearly.
  • Many more are injured.
  • Traffic optimization
  • Congestion/traffic jams cost time and fuel.

Both these problems can be solved or mitigated
by giving timely information to the drivers!
7
Differences from MANET
  • Large scale potentially billion
  • Fleeting contact with other vehicles
  • Nodes not as constrained in terms of energy,
    storage and computation.

8
VANET applications
  • Safety alerts
  • Requirement Bounded latency
  • Primary Issue Broadcast storm
  • Congestion warning
  • Requirement Message persistence
  • Primary Issue Disconnected network
  • Infotainment
  • Requirement End-to-end connectivity
  • Primary Issue Disconnection due to high mobility

9
Application-1 Congestion Detection
  • Vehicles detect congestion when
  • Vehicles gt Threshold 1
  • Speed lt Threshold 2
  • Relay congestion information
  • Hop-by-hop message forwarding
  • Other vehicles can choose alternate routes

10
Application-2 Deceleration Warning
  • Prevent pile-ups when a vehicle decelerates
    rapidly

11
Attackers
  • Insider or outsider
  • Insider valid user
  • Outsider Intruder, limited attack options
  • Malicious or rational
  • Malicious No personal benefit, intends to harm
    other users
  • Rational seeks personal benefits, more
    predictable attack
  • Active or passive
  • Active Generates packets, participates in the
    network
  • Passive Eavesdrop, track users

12
Security Attacks
Goals
Execution
Actions
Congestion Creation/ avoidance
Insert bogus congestion warnings
Single
Single, multiple Entities (Sybil)
Misrepresent Location of accident
Cause accidents or pile-ups
Track individuals
Multiple
Message suppression
Aggressive insertion of messages/jamming
Denial of service
Independent
Colluding
13
Security Requirements
  • Authentication
  • React only to legitimate events. Authenticate
    senders of messages.
  • Verification of data consistency
  • Legitimate senders can send false data
    (attack/unintentional). Can cause immense damage
    even fatalities.
  • Availability
  • Network should be available under jamming attacks
  • Non-repudiation
  • Drivers causing accidents should be reliably
    identified
  • Privacy (conflicts with authentication)
  • Privacy of drivers against unauthorized
    observers.
  • Real-time constraints
  • High speed means constraints on time

14
Security Architecture
15
Key Management
  • Key distribution
  • How will the key be distributed ?
  • Key certification
  • Who will certify the keys ?
  • Key revocation
  • When the key is compromised, what is the
    revocation procedure ?

16
Tamper-proof device
  • Each vehicle carries a tamper-proof device
  • Contains the secrets of the vehicle itself
  • Has its own battery
  • Has its own clock (notably in order to be able to
    sign timestamps)
  • Is in charge of all security operations
  • Is accessible only by authorized personnel

Tamper-proof device
((( )))
Vehicle sensors (GPS, speed and acceleration,)
Transmissionsystem
On-boardCPU
17
Digital signatures
  • Symmetric cryptography is not suitable messages
    are standalone, large scale, non-repudiation
    requirement
  • Hence each message should be signed with a DS
  • Liability-related messages should be stored in
    the EDR

18
VPKI (Vehicular PKI)
  • Each vehicle carries in its Tamper-Proof Device
    (TPD)
  • A unique and certified identity Electronic
    License Plate (ELP)
  • A set of certified anonymous public/private key
    pairs
  • Before a vehicle sends a safety message, it
    signs it with its private key and includes the
    CAs certificate.
  • Mutual authentication can be done without
    involving a server
  • Authorities (national or regional) are
    cross-certified

19
The CA hierarchy two options
1. Governmental Transportation Authorities
2. Manufacturers
Manuf. 1
Manuf. 2
Car B
Car A
Car B
Car A
  • The governments control certification
  • Long certificate chain
  • Keys should be recertified on borders to ensure
    mutual certification
  • Vehicle manufacturers are trusted
  • Only one certificate is needed
  • Each car has to store the keys of all vehicle
    manufacturers

20
Key revocation
  • All cryptographic material of a vehicle is
    compromised
  • CA sends revocation message to the TPD.
  • A particular key is compromised
  • CA sends revocation message to the TPD for each
    revoked key. High overhead.
  • Short key certificate lifetimes. Large storage
    required.

21
Security primitives
  • Authenticated localization of message origin
  • Option 1
  • Beacons broadcast location with timestamp and
    signature. Include this packet in all messages.
  • Requires infrastructure.
  • Option 2 Use relative localization

22
Security primitives Contd.
  • Anonymization service
  • Attempt to balance authentication and privacy
  • Option 1
  • Key changing algorithm that adapts to vehicle
    speed
  • A large set of keys needs to be stored in the
    vehicle and periodically renewed (during regular
    vehicle maintenance visits)
  • Option 2
  • Drivers authenticate to a service with their
    permanent Id and receive a temporary Id that
    cannot be traced back to the driver.
  • Infrastructure required.

23
Security primitives Contd.
  • Secure aggregation
  • Vehicle count the number of vehicles it passes
    and reports the sum. Receiving vehicle
    authenticates the information and is able to
    estimate the amount of traffic ahead.

24
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