Enhancing African

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Enhancing African Regional Integration Policy
Coherence and Overlapping Memberships Presentatio
n to the World Bank Course on Regional
Integration in Africa and EPAs Nairobi,
Kenya 22-24 May 2006 Mark Pearson
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• Regional Integration Setting the Scene

Objective to create the AEC and AU Methodology
gradualist, through establishment of RECs, as
opposed to more immediate approach of creating
united states of Africa.
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• Pre-conditions for Regional Integration

i) a strong political commitment ii) peaceful
environment and governance iii) economic
stability iv) open to trade with third
countries v) complementarity among
economies vi) strong institution with clear
mandate, adequate resources and political
support vii) variable geometry viii) broad
participation by the private sector and civil
society and ix) subsidiarity.
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• RECs Different Origins

PTA/COMESA Lagos Plan of Action and closely
aligned to UNECA regional structures (MULPOC)
reason for technical nature? SADCC/SADC
political cooperation of FLS to address economic
position of independent states vis-à-vis South
Africa, apartheid and independence of Zimbabwe
and Namibia. EAC long history of successful
economic cooperation revival of EAC which
collapsed in 1977.
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• Overlapping Membership

Coordination of RECs not new - OAU's 1987 Summit
Declaration requested the Secretary-General of
the OAU, the Executive Secretary of the UNECA and
the authorities of sub-regional and regional
groupings, particularly ECOWAS, PTA, SADCC and
ECCAS, to take the necessary steps to ensure
co-ordination, harmonization and rationalization
in their respective regions in order to avert
overlaps, power conflicts and wastage of efforts
and resources.
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• Reasons for overlaps

Different focus of different RECs ECOWAS and
PTA, had a strong focus on economic integration
IGADD and SADCC, had more a focus on functional
cooperation. Countries becoming members of more
than one REC not a major policy coherence problem
until Member States expand the mandates
overlapping mandates lead to what the World Bank
refers to as the "Spaghetti Bowl" and what the AU
refers to as "institutional cacophony".
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Rwanda Burundi
DR. Congo
Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Sudan
COMESA
Uganda Kenya
Egypt Libya
Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe
Comoros Madagascar Seychelles
Mauritius
Swaziland
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Rwanda Burundi
DR. Congo
Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Sudan
COMESA
Uganda Kenya
EAC
Tanzania
Egypt Libya
Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe
IOC
Mauritius
Comoros Madagascar Seychelles
Reunion
Swaziland
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Rwanda Burundi
DR. Congo
Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Sudan
COMESA
Uganda Kenya
EAC
Tanzania
Egypt Libya
Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe
IOC
Comoros Madagascar Seychelles
SACU
Mauritius
Reunion
Swaziland
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa
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Rwanda Burundi
SADC
Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Sudan
DR. Congo
COMESA
Uganda Kenya
Tanzania
EAC
Egypt Libya
Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe
Mozambique
IOC
Angola
Mauritius Madagascar
Comoros Seychelles
Reunion
SACU
Swaziland
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa
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• Add Cotonou

Cotonou Agreement - by building on existing
regional integration arrangements, to assist with
the smooth and gradual integration of the ACP
States into the world economy and to enhance the
production, supply and trading capacity of the
ACP countries as well as their capacity to
attract investment. These two main objectives are
to be achieved in conformity with the provisions
of the WTO, taking account of the respective
levels of development of ACP countries and are to
be achieved through the negotiation of EPAs.
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• Configuration of EPAs

Left to the ACP States to decide configuration
but now evidence of pressure being brought to
bear on configurations to suit ECs view of the
world. Can be argued that EPA configurations do
not strengthen regional integration in the way
Cotonou envisaged overlaps in trade
arrangements between ESA EPA, EAC, COMESA,
EuroMed, SADC7, SADC, SACU, TDCA.
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Not added IGAD, ECCAS and CEMAC
Rwanda Burundi
SADC
Djibouti Eritrea Ethiopia Sudan
COMESA
Uganda Kenya
Tanzania
EAC
Mozambique
Malawi Zambia Zimbabwe
Angola
IOC
SACU
Mauritius Madagascar
Swaziland
Comoros Seychelles
Reunion
Botswana Lesotho Namibia South Africa
SADC EPA group
Eastern Southern Africa EPA group
D.R. Congo
Egypt Libya
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• Studies on Overlaps

1992 PTA proposal to merge PTA and SADC
rejected by SADC. 1992 ADB study PTA North and
South rejected by PTA. 2005 GTZ Study
Variable Geometry Option or SACU and EAC
Option Enlarged SACU and EAC become fully
fledged CUs by 2010, and countries not
participating in the CUs remain members of the
SADC or COMESA FTAs in short term with a view to
forming two separate CUs as SADC and COMESA in
the medium term.
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• 1993 Joint PTA/SADC Study

i) Maintaining the status-quo harmonisation

through a joint coordination
committee ii) Merger of PTA and SADC iii) 4
sub-regional groupings iv) PTA North and PTA
South v) Fresh discussions between
Secretariats vi) PTA and SADC as building
blocks AEC.
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• Issues to address

COMESA and EAC customs union and overlap of
membership. SADC and EAC customs union and
overlap of membership. SACU and SADC SADC
Customs Union by 2010 how will this be achieved
and will it be an extension of SACU or a
replacement? SADC and COMESA Different trade
protocols and policies seems to be more a
potential problem. Problem if both move to a
customs union.
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• Issues to address

TDCA and SADC EPA TDCA de facto applies to BLNS
need for SADC EPA to negotiate a trade
agreement? What happens to Tanzania, Angola and
Mozambique? ESA EPA and SADC EPA Efforts to
have a joint COMESA-SADC EPA failed. Now ESA and
SADC need to negotiate separate trade and
development components. Is there a development
component in any EPA? ESA EPA and COMESA
contradiction between ESA and COMESA?
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• Issues to address

Euro-Mediterranean FTA and COMESA FTA and CU
The Euro-Mediterranean FTA is signed between
Egypt (also a COMESA FTA member), Tunisia,
Morocco and Jordan (with Libya as an observer) as
a group and the EU and is expected to be
implemented by 2010.
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• Overlap Costs and Benefits

Disadvantages of multiple membership conflicting
programmes in trade and trade related issues
financial costs possible waste of resources
through duplication of effort . Possible
advantages different functionalities only a
problem when mandates and agendas overlap or
contradict each other. Policy co-ordination by
Member States co-ordination of implementation
by Secretariats. If managed effectively regional
integration can assist with multilateralism.
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• Recent Harmonisation Attempts

Establishment of the COMESA/SADC Task Force by
the then Chairmen of COMESA and SADC in the
margins of the 2001 COMESA Summit has met at
least once a year since establishment but little
in terms of results apart from improved
relationships. IRCC harmonisation of
implementation MoU between EAC and COMESA and
IOC COMESA Establishment of EAC/COMESA/SADC Task
Force and sub-committees in March 2006.
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• Harmonisation - Conclusions

Policy harmonisation of RECs can only be done by
the African countries (not REC Secretariats)
which created the RECs and when the AU has the
responsibility and authority to
coordinate. Harmonisation should be done at the
pace decided by African States not by outside
observers. The objectives of harmonisation of
RECs should be determined by African States.
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Enhancing African Regional Integration Policy
Coherence and Overlapping Memberships Presentatio
n to the World Bank Course on Regional
Integration in Africa and EPAs THANK YOU