The governance of the Lisbon Strategy

1
The governance of the Lisbon Strategy

• A sociological institutionalist approach

2
Contents

• Defining the main research question
• What is so special about Lisbon?
• The limits of existing analytical frameworks
• Applying the sociological institutionalist
  approach
• The new agenda of Lisbon more or less
  institutionalization?

3
Defining the main question

• Classical integration theories
• What explains the creation of the Lisbon
  strategy? (more/less integration)
• Governance perspective
• What explains success and failure? (and
  asymmetric patterns )
• Political economy gt
• Success or failure?
• Dynamics of behavioural change and coordination

4
What is so special about the Lisbon strategy?

• Repackaging policy issues under a new cognitive
  background political compromise gt
• Lisbon economies of scope (broad agenda)
• SEM economies of scale (limited agenda)
• Changing political entrepreneurship
• Lisbon gt Council entrepreneurship Commission
  regained position
• SEM gt the opposite

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• Objectives
• Lisbon gt economic goals little focus on
  procedures
• SEM gt legal/structural goals most focus on
  procedures
• Instruments
• Lisbon gt mainly new modes of governance gt
  Emphasis on coordination rather than transfer of
  competences
• SEM gt only de-regulation and re-regulation gt
  Emphasis on transfer of competences rather than
  coordination.

6
The limits of existing analytical frameworks

• Rationalist approach gt Theory of collective
  action
• Type of public goods (inclusive/exclusive) or
  type of coordination problem (prisoners dilemma
  battle of sexes)
• The problem of collective action is essentially a
  distribution problem.

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• Conclusion
• Lisbon strategy needs centralized and
  hierarchical action / strong shadow of hierarchy.
  
• OMC and other voluntary-based instruments will
  never prevent free-riding.
• The explanatory limits of rationalism
• There is preliminary evidence that there are some
  successful stories of voluntary coordination
• The approach does not have the analytical tools
  to explain asymmetric success and failure (or how
  real actors interact)
• Not all Lisbon issues are truly problems of
  collective action / coordination problems (i.e.
  employment policy is a response to the loss of
  jobs everywhere in Europe (a similar problem),
  not to intra-EU social dumping).

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• Historical institutionalism
• SEM Institutional factors explaining the success
  of the governance of the SEM project
• Jurisprudence of ECJ
• The autonomous role of the Commission
• QMV in the Council
• Interest groups pro-liberalization
• Lisbon gt These factors are not in place
• No role of legal- jurisprudence instruments
• The Comission with limited political leadership
• Ad-hoc / different decision-making procedures
• Interests groups active in some areas not in
  all due to broad agenda

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The governance of the Lisbon agenda

• European integration by
• Voluntary coordinated action
• Non-regulatory instruments
• No positive / negative integration processes
• We need to have a look at institutionalization
  with other eyes
• Not as legalization or juridification
• But as institutionalization of norms and values
• Therefore we need to
• Come back to the micro-foundations of political
  action
• Find analytical framework within
  neo-institutionalism that allows for a more
  flexible understanding of institutionalization
  processes beyond / besides legalization

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Applying the sociological institutionalist
approach

• Sociological institutionalism is particularly
  well endowed to do that.
• Institutionalization
• Individual behaviour is based on logic of
  consequenciality or logic of appropriedtness
• Political processes that are aggregative or
  integrative
• Main question What explains success / failure ?

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• Dependent variable successful coordination
• Independent variables successful voluntary
  coordination takes place if
• (Rational institutionalism)
• There is shadow of hierarchy
• there is a high level of dependency among actors.
• there is an equal distribution of costs/benefits
  among organizations.
• (Sociological institutionalism
• the majority of actors share the normative
  grounds
• the majority of the actors express an
  international and European identity.
• There is a shadow of the future
• intermediate actors have made use of specific
  tools to promote the contents of the CCRR.
• intermediate actors promoting it show good
  persuasive capacity.

12
The new agenda of Lisbon more or less
institutionalization?

• Debates about Lisbon is not delivering are
  reinforcing the institutionalization of
• The content gt focused
• The procedures gt 3year national reform plans
• Paradoxically the partial success/failure of
  Lisbon is its strenght because it is putting
  pressure towards more institutionalization, not
  less.