La Crisis financiera en Asia en 1998 y la miopia de la agencias de clasificacion de riesgo - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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La Crisis financiera en Asia en 1998 y la miopia de la agencias de clasificacion de riesgo

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Title: La Crisis financiera en Asia en 1998 y la miopia de la agencias de clasificacion de riesgo


1
La Crisis financiera en Asia en 1998 y la miopia
de la agencias de clasificacion de riesgo
  • ESAN 2006
  • Michel-Henry Bouchet CERAM/Finconet
  • Ephraïm Clark - Middlesex University
  • Bertrand Groslambert - CERAM

2
Plano
  • Introduccion
  • Risk perception and rating agencies
  • Financial Crisis, Herd Instinct and Spill-over
    Effect
  • The actual Economic and Financial Situation
  • Empirical Study
  • Conclusions

3
The Asian Financial Crisis
  • Two Main Features
  • Abrupt Crisis end-1997
  • Currency devaluations
  • Stock market collapses
  • IFIs and rating agencies caught off guard
  • Spill-over Effect
  • From Thailand to Asian countries
  • From Asian to world-wide stock markets
  • From Asia to other EMCs in Latin America (Brazil)
    and Eastern Europe (Russia)

4
The Macro-economic Situation - I
  • The tigers seemingly sound economic
    situation
  • Good macroeconomic performance until 1996

Source IMF/International Financial Statistics
1999
5
The Macro-economic Situation - II
  • A seemingly sound economic situation
  • A prudent fiscal policy A controlled inflation
    rate

Source IMF/ International Financial Statistics
1999
6
The Macro-economic Situation- III
  • A seemingly sound economic situation
  • A strong investment rate high saving rates

Source International Financial Statistics
(1999), Global Development Finance (1998)
7
Trade liberalization as dynamic growth engine
8
The Macro-economic Situation - IV
  • A seemingly sound economic situation
  • Current account deficit but large FDI (non
    debt-creating flows)
  • Official reserve assets rising till end-1996
  • Interest/Export ratios between 3 (Korea
    Malaysia) and 10 (Indonesia)

Source International Financial Statistics
(1999), Global Development Finance (1998)
9
The Perceived Situation V
  • Asias most distinguishing macroeconomic feature
    over the past few decades has been a very high
    saving rate.
  • With an average saving rate of 30 of GDP, Asian
    powerhouses were able to garner the resources to
    invest in growth without over-reliance on foreign
    savings, hence without resorting to debt
    financing.
  • Euromoney/Deutsche Bank 2000 Guide to Asian Debt
    Markets

10
Country Risk Ratings
  • Shortcomings/Cons
  • reductionist
  • over-simplistic
  • risk of self-fulfilling prophecy
  • little predictive value
  • weighted average tends to bury salient trends
  • gives market consensus often made of herd
    instinct
  • Advantages/ Pros
  • simple
  • shrinks a large number of variables into one
    single grade
  • cross-country comparison
  • comparison across time
  • reliable for smooth risk evolution

11
The Perceived Situation
  • Was the crisis anticipated by rating agencies?

12
EUROMONEYs Risk Ratingthe higher the score, the
larger the risk
Agencies were blind for too long then hammered
the counties with abrupt downgrading
13
Rating poor early warning signal?
  • 1997 Asia risk ? Its like growth stocks
    sovereign risk has never looked better 
  • Institutional Investor (March 1997)
  • South Korea wa s rated as Italy and Sweden as
    recently as October of 1997! but has been
    abruptly downgraded to junk bond status!
  •  There were no early warnings about Korea from
    us or, to the best of our knowledge, from other
    market participants and our customers should
    expect a better job from us  FITCH IBCA January
    14, 1998

14
  • Ex Post Analysis unsustainable economic
    growth!
  • Structural Weaknesses
  • Weak banking supervision and crony capitalism
  • Undercapitalized banks and large non-performing
    assets
  • Stable dollar-pegged exchange rates
  • Highly indebted corporate sector
  • External Debt Overhang for Indonesia, Thailand
    and Korea

London Club commercial bank claims in US million
15
The Conventional Wisdom VI-
  • Financial markets did not anticipate
  • Financial markets overreacted
  • Herd instinct, spill-over effect and
    self-fulfilling prophecy
  • World Bank (1998) "markets and market observers
    failed to anticipate the scope and severity of
    the crisis
  • Herd Instinct
  •  sheep  mentality characterized by a lack of
    individuality, causing people to think and act
    like the general population. It contributes to
    unsubstantiated rallies or sell-offs.

16
Markets and Rating Agencies shortsightedness
  • Observed Risk Premium subtracting the US T-bond
    yield from the average yield to maturity (nearest
    maturity to the countrys debt duration)

17
After Asia some lessons of the crisis
  • Any agency which rated the Republic of Korea at
    the high investment grade rating of AA- (in the
    case of Fitch IBCA and SPs) or A1 (in the case
    of Moodys) before the crisis and which now rates
    Korea at a speculative grade B- was clearly
    either wrong initially or subsequently. Clients
    are entitled to expect us to perform better in
    the future.
  • Fitch IBCA January 13, 1998
  • When the facts change, I change my mind
  • J.M Keynes

18
The Clark (1991) Method
  • Clark's approach to cross-border risk analysis
  • A country's economy a financial asset
  • Adopting the perspective of an international
    economic agent (investor, exporter or creditor)
  • Is the economy able to generate enough hard
    currency cash to meet foreign obligations?
  • (similar method to that of California-based
    KMV-Moodys to assess an enterprises credit risk
    as reflecting uncertain future economic
    performance. Risk is considered as volatility in
    market values! Credit risk is viewed as a
    portfolio management problem, requiring timely
    measurement of default probabilities)

19
The Method
  • This approach allows to compute
  • The foreign economy' s market value
  • The macroeconomic market rate of return
  • Therefore, it generates the inputs required to
    apply the Modern Financial Theory
  • Option Pricing Model

20
The Option Pricing Tool (Black/Scholes 1973)
  • Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities
  • Corporate debt considered as sale of companys
    assets to creditors with shareholders owning an
    option to buy the assets back.
  • On the exercise date, if value of assets gt
    nominal value of debt, the shareholders will
    exercise their option and buy back the assets (by
    paying the debt). Otherwise, the company defaults
    and creditors take possession of the assets.
  • gt When firm borrows, it boils down to
  • lenders effectively acquire company
  • companys shareholders are given call options to
    buy the company back (underlying asset) by
    repaying debt (strike price)

21
The Option Pricing Tool
  • Option applied to cross-border risk analysis
  • Computation of the implied volatility
  • Based on market data
  • Market value of the call
  • Market value of the economy
  • - Market value of the debt (? Face Value x e-YTM
    x Duration)

Macroeconomic Balance Sheet
  • Market Value of
  • the Economy
  • Market Value of the Debt
  • Market Value of the Call Option

22
The Option Pricing Tool
  • Option applied to cross border risk analysis
  • We are given
  • Underlying asset market value of the economy
    (expected value of future cash-flows of the
    stream of hard currency export income of Goods
    Services)
  • Strike price present value of projected debt
    service
  • Risk free rate US T-bonds
  • Time to maturity duration of the external debt
  • Market value of the call
  • gt Implied volatility ?

23
The Data
  • Marked to market data are required
  • Difficult because no Brady Bonds (except
    Philippines)
  • London-based ISMA Database
  • Eurobond market
  • Issued amount weighted average YTM
  • Brady bonds Philippines

24
The Empirical Study
  • Volatility implied by the observed risk premium

25
The Empirical Study
  • What does the implied volatility suggest?
  • Market clearly perceived the risky nature of
    Asian countries
  • Implied volatility between 40 and 90
  • As of the end of 1996
  • Philippines was the less risky
  • Malaysia was the second less risky immediately
    followed by Thailand
  • Korea and Indonesia very risky

26
Protracted Impact of the crisis
  • What was the extent of the crisis?
  • Philippines and Malaysia less affected
  • Korea and Thailand severely affected
  • Indonesia the most badly hit

27
Net Short-term bank debt
US billion
Source BIS
28
(No Transcript)
29
Ratio of Net short-term debt/Official reserve
assets
Source BIS
30
Capital fligth as early warning signal
Currency overvaluation
K flight repatriation
31
Conclusions
  • Rational portfolio rebalancing
  • Not a mindless, indiscriminate panic

32
Country Risk Analysis
  • Further readings
  • Risk Magazines (Euromoney, Institutional
    Investor, RISK)
  • Bouchet The political Economy of International
    Debt, Greenwood/Praeger
  • Bouchet alii The Market-Based Menu Approach
    (World Bank-DMFAS)
  • International Debt and the Developing Countries,
    WB Symposium, edited by Smith and Cuddington
  • Bouchet, Clark, Groslambert, Wiley, 2003
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